The Myth of Military Aid: The Case of French Military Cooperation in Africa

Since decolonization, France has maintained military accords with eight African countries and programs of military cooperation with 23 others. These close military ties have four official objectives: “protecting the territory of France’s African allies, protecting the local population, and building and keeping peace.” ¹

But it seems doubtful that French military cooperation really does enhance overall security on the continent by preventing national or regional conflicts and the misuse of military resources, given the ambiguous realities of the programs’ impact. The recent involvement of the French military in Rwanda, the three interventions in the Central African Republic, ² and recent lobbying for an intervention to defend and protect President Mobutu’s regime in Zaire cast a much less favorable light on the goals of French military involvement in Africa. Considering recent failures of French military cooperation and military reform, the future of the French military cooperation system is in turmoil. Only through international pressure and internal reappraisals does it seem possible that French military cooperation in Africa can turn in the right direction.

French Military Cooperation with African Countries

French policy in Africa has two objectives: securing mineral and commercial interests and more importantly, protecting and promoting the use of the French language. France’s commercial interests in Africa remain substantial. In 1996, the French trade surplus with sub-Saharan Africa was FF13 billion, and FF21.5 billion with Africa as a whole. In comparison, France exports goods worth only FF26 billion to Latin America, and FF30 billion to China. ³ While trade surplus and exports cannot be directly compared, these numbers do give an indication of France’s relative economic interests in Africa. Regarding the cultural and linguistic policies (Francophonie), the continued use of French in African countries is considered by many an essential symbol of France’s international importance.

Accordingly, French military cooperation with African countries was designed to secure France’s investments after the independence of its colonies in Africa and to protect heads of state favorably inclined to the perpetuation of a French presence in Africa. It was a neo-colonial structure, best personified by President de Gaulle’s African adviser, Jacques Foccart. In the 1960s and 1970s, French political and economic interests in Africa were far more important than today—the French nuclear arsenal was produced with African uranium for example—and military cooperation was designed to preserve them. Today, these interests have declined substantially: several African strategic materials, such as uranium in Niger, are no longer useful to France; Franco-African trade has gradually declined since 1986; and French businesses have suffered severe setbacks in Africa in recent years, such as Elf-Aquitaine’s loss of the Congolese oil export monopoly in 1992. ⁴ Yet the French military cooperation system, created to protect substantial interests by tightly controlling African political life, has clearly not adapted to reduced French interests in Africa.

French Military Cooperation with African Countries

The Defense Accords—At independence, the French government concluded defense accords with Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Cameroon, the Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, Togo, and the Central African Republic. Each accord asserts that the African state “is responsible for its external and internal defense,” but can request to “be assisted by the French Republic.” ⁵ The precise conditions under which France can provide military assistance to an African country faced with an external threat, although included in the accords, are classified. Nonetheless, it can be inferred from past French experience in Africa that the conditions for intervention are very vague. Indeed, external threats are defined by French military officials as “every reaction, based on military attacks or not, using conventional military means or not, directed or backed by an external country.” ⁶

In the case of an intervention related to an internal crisis (a coup or other internal destabilization), the accords do not question the popular legitimacy of African heads of state. In fact, France will protect heads of state considered to be important for the protection of its national interests. The three French interventions in the Central African Republic provide good examples of the...