Correspondence

To the Editor:

In the September 1996 issue of Reviews in American History Brian Villa and John Bonnett offer an extreme attack on my work and on my recent book The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. They charge me with “breaking the rules” of accepted scholarship, “systematically and repeatedly” avoiding significant evidence, violating the “canons of the [historical] profession,” etc. When one examines the basis for such strong statements, however, something rather odd emerges: Villa and Bonnett seem to be characterizing their own work, not mine. Let me explain:

The review begins with the claim that I have been adamantly and indignantly determined to paint an extreme and oversimplified moral picture of Truman administration evil—a “cycle of depravity” allowing for no moral ambiguity. Here, however, is what I actually wrote on the subject: “None of the officials who made the decision to use the atomic bomb did so out of evil intent. Their motives, broadly speaking, were good; their intentions well-meaning” (Decision, p. 637).

Again, Villa and Bonnett quote me (or so it seems) as follows: The Truman administration clearly understood “before the atomic bomb was used that the war with Japan could be ended by other means without significant loss of life” (p. xiii). But the partially quoted text is actually a question, not an assertion: Villa and Bonnett neglect to mention that they have omitted the following italicized language: “The most important issue, of course, is whether it was understood before the atomic bomb was used that the war with Japan could be ended by other means without significant loss of life” (p. xiii).

Villa and Bonnett claim as “the most disturbing excision” of evidence a sentence in which (they say) I declare that during the summer of 1945 Japanese leaders had reached a “‘unanimous determination’ to seek surrender through Moscow” (p. 651). Here the manipulation of language and meaning is blatant: the actual sentence—taken from a summary discussion in the Afterword of the book—refers to intelligence documents discussed at length earlier in the text. It reads in full: “[T]he August intercepts which now showed ‘unanimous determination’ to surrender through Moscow were an important new signal of the [Japanese] army’s position—a point explicitly noted by U.S. intelligence at the time.” (A reference note is provided.)

The “unanimous determination” phrase has been set off for a reason: it is a direct quotation taken from an intercepted Japanese message which had previously been discussed at length in the main text of the book (p. 406). Contrary to the oversimplified assertion which Villa and Bonnett set up in order to attack, here is how I characterize the Japanese position at this particular point in time: “there was obviously still room for considerable debate about final terms” (pp. 412–13).

Or consider the reviewers’ outrage that (according to them) I devote only one sentence (p. 417) to the August 9, 1945, Japanese Cabinet meeting concerning surrender. “This,” they solemnly intone, “is unacceptable.” Here what is omitted is the fact that the questions and evidence scholars have long debated concerning Japan’s decision-making process at this point in time are expressly taken up elsewhere in the book—in a section where the modern Japanese- and English-language literature on the subject is discussed (pp. 643–53 and reference notes pp. 776–77). Moreover, a footnote on the page in question (p. 417) specifically refers readers to this section. Since Villa and Bonnett also quote from the same section in their review, the claim that I have totally ignored—“evaded”!—the issues involved is not only amazing but disingenuous, to say the least.

All of this is rather extraordinary, and given adequate space, one could go on, point by point. However, what is not reported at all by Villa and Bonnett is even more important than what is manipulated and misreported. One of the truly fundamental argumen ts of The Decisionis that before the atomic bomb was used President Truman was advised there was a high likelihood the war would end when Russia abandoned its neutral position and the massive Red Army attacked Japan in early August...