Response to the Commentaries

It is not easy to engender a dialogue between two theoretical traditions. At least three conditions have to be fulfilled before such a dialogue can get started. In the first place, there has to be a common interest. Secondly, there has to be a divergence of perspectives. Thirdly, both parties have to be prepared to learn something from one another. In my paper I tried to clear the ground for a dialogue between cognitive psychology and hermeneutics. I argued that there is a common interest, the understanding of human action as a process of meaning-making. I also argued that cognitive psychology and hermeneutics are different, in that the first relates meaning to theoretical frameworks (sets of representations), whereas the second emphasizes that meaning is the result of practical engagement in an intersubjective world. Finally, I tried to create mutual openness by focusing on a concrete subject (PTSD), critically examining hermeneutic philosophy by applying it to a field in which cognitive psychology has proven to be fruitful, and challenging cognitive psychology by thematizing elements of truth that tend to be obliterated from a cognitive perspective.

The possibility of a meaningful dialogue between cognitive psychology and hermeneutics can be put into question by criticizing any of the three presuppositions mentioned above. It may be doubted whether cognitive psychology and hermeneutics share a common interest. This doubt is formulated by McMillan, who argues that cognitive psychology aims to formulate explanatory theories, which have a predictive power, whereas hermeneutics seeks to explore the meaning of human behavior. It may also be doubted whether cognitive psychology and hermeneutics present different views on the nature of human action. This doubt is expressed by Warner, who questions the difference between following implicit rules and responding experientially to the world. Finally, it may be doubted whether it makes sense to aim at a merger of the perspectives of hermeneutics and cognitive psychology in the case of PTSD. This doubt is brought to the fore by Phillips, who claims that hermeneutics is superior to cognitive psychology in explaining meaning and mental disorder, and that both perspectives are in need of correction, since they underestimate the importance of affect and emotion.

Let us first consider the argument of McMillan. He emphasizes the difference between cognitive psychology and hermeneutics, the one aiming at explanation and prediction, the other focusing on understanding and interpretation. Although explanation and understanding are considered as fundamentally different by many hermeneutic philosophers (including Gadamer), I doubt whether the distinction can be applied to characterize the differences between cognitive psychology and hermeneutics in the way McMillan does. Insofar as cognitive psychology is interested in meaning, it is not an explanatory science in the strict sense. The intentional stance does not enable us to formulate strict laws about human behavior, comparable to the laws of nature. It involves the presupposition that behavior is meaningful, which implies that it can be understood as rule-governed instead of lawlike. Because they focus on meaning, cognitive psychology and hermeneutics are both interested in understanding, rather than in explanation.

Following the distinction between three kinds of interpersonal understanding made by Gadamer, the cognitive psychologist does not refer to laws of human nature (as is done in the first kind of interpersonal understanding), but focuses on the unique motives of the other (which is characteristic of the second kind of interpersonal understanding). In contrast with the hermeneutic perspective, the interpretation of these motives is seen as a theoretical endeavor, which does not involve the researcher in a dialogue. Thus, the difference between cognitive psychology and hermeneutics is a difference between two kinds of interpretation, the one theoretical and distanciated, the other practical and engaged.

According to McMillan, interpretation is incompatible with prediction. This is true if prediction is seen as the counterpart of explanation in terms of universal laws. Yet, this does not imply that in interpreting behavior one makes no inferences about the future. If one regards the other person’s behavior as meaningful, one assumes that it is part of a larger pattern, which has...