Commentary on "The Stoic Conception of Mental Disorder"

Professor Lennart Nordenfelt’s thesis is that Cicero has presented us with “the first Diagnostic Manual of Mental Disorders.” In making this “peculiar” claim Nordenfelt seems to be mistaken about the thrust of the Stoic project and Cicero’s presentation of it, and mistaken about the Stoic view of irrational responses.

As Nordenfelt correctly observes, Cicero is not remembered for the originality of his ideas, but for transmitting Greek thought to Roman culture. The Stoic goal that he sought to communicate was that people should try to achieve perfect reason and to live according to reason. In that light, the Stoic philosophers’ principle objective was to help people recognize the kinds of things that were out of their control, the manifestations of God and the handiwork of providence, and to respond according to reason in those things that are within human control, in one’s actions and in molding one’s character. These fundamental Stoic commitments were most succinctly expressed by Epictetus (a.d. 55–135), the slave who studied and taught Stoic philosophy in Rome. The Manual, a concise summary of Epictetus’s doctrine, begins,

Of things some are in our power, and others are not. In our power are opinion, movement toward a thing, desire, aversion (turning from a thing), and in a word, whatever are our own acts; not in our power are the body, property, reputation, offices (magisterial power), and, in a word, whatever are not our own acts. . . . Remember then that if you think . . . the things which are in the power of others to be your own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will blame both gods and men. . . .

(1)

The Manual goes on to explain that

In everything which pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is loved, remember to add this: “What is its nature?” If you love an earthen vessel, say it is an earthen vessel which you love; when it has been broken, you will not be disturbed. If you are kissing your child or wife, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing; if the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed.

(3)

The point of these references is to show that the thrust of Stoicism is directing behavior toward rational understanding of the world and toward rational choice. To the extent that bodily or mental illness makes people incapable of rational choice, they are not addressed by Stoic philosophy. An illness, however, could be just another providential occurrence that a person could respond to with reason. Illness and mental illness are subjects for the Stoic’s attention only to the extent that one can rationally respond. Again, citing Epictetus,

Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless the will itself chooses. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the will.

(9)

With this basic understanding of the Stoic project, it is difficult to take seriously Nordenfelt’s view that Cicero has produced a catalogue of mental disorders. It is more likely that the deviations from the rational that Cicero names are merely descriptive of how people can be less than ideally rational. It is a huge leap from describing kinds of poor judgment to assuming that Cicero intends to discuss anything that we might call mental disorders.

In his discussion of irrational responses, Nordenfelt directs our attention to Cicero’s The Tusculan Disputations. I would like to focus instead on Cicero’s De Amicitia (On Friendship, 44 b.c.) because it was written at about the same time as The Tusculan Disputations and because it serves as a clear counter-example to Nordenfelt’s reading. Laelius, the principle speaker of the dialogue-treatise, represents Cicero’s Stoic position. His close friend, Scipio, has just died, and, inserted into the general discussion about the nature of friendship, Laelius explains how a virtuous person should be affected by such a death. He declares,

I do indeed grieve! After all, I have been bereaved of a friend. . . . But I am in no need of panaceas; I am quite...