Response to the Commentary

It would be hazardous indeed in these postmodern times to aspire to absolute truth, or, what probably comes to same, to suppose that one has a perspective which subsumes all others. This was not my intention in Encoding of meaning (EM), and I am grateful to Wiggins and Schwartz for the opportunity to say so. For the most part, the line of thought in EM seeks to track the consequences of adopting a particular perspective, defined largely by the aim of finding causal explanations of human behavior, normal and otherwise. The argument is that when operating within this perspective, one can and should envisage meanings as causes. I have assumed that this argument goes against the traditional distinction between meaningful and causal connections, with its immediate and surely intended consequence that meaningful connections, by virtue of being meaningful, are not themselves causal. This is the basic rationale for referring to the “deconstruction” of the meaning/causality distinction in the subtitle of EM. Wiggins and Schwartz rightly wish to preserve perspectives on meaning other than what may be involved in causality, and nothing in EM was intended to deny the distinctiveness and validity of such other perspectives.

Further, I agree with Wiggins and Schwartz that the epistemology of meaning is in certain critical respects to be distinguished from the epistemology of non-meaningful connections, such as those studied in the physical sciences, for example. Specifically, knowledge of meaningful connections tends to be particular, and to involve something like empathy. This was part and parcel of the traditional distinction between meaning and causes, of course, and between understanding and explaining. The argument in EM is not intended to deny these and other distinctive features of meaning, but is rather to say simply that, nevertheless, meanings can be causes.

The question then arises about how important the quest for causes is, or indeed should be, in psychology and psychiatry. From the standpoint of empirical scientific method, this aim is of course fundamental. The argument in EM, directed at those within that methodology, is that meanings can be expected to show up in the etiological models, and should in particular not be excluded a priori on the basis of the old idea that meanings are one thing and causes another. This is the argument at its simplest. The position is somewhat more complicated in relation to the standpoint of hermeneutics, because here the aim of finding causes is not regarded as fundamental. But it is the question of exclusion which is critical here. The question whether, among the things which one seeks to understand about meaning using hermeneutic methods, causal role is to be allowed as one but not the only point of interest, or whether the possibility of causal role to be excluded a priori on the basis of the idea that meanings are one thing and causes another. Insofar as Wiggins and Schwartz envisage the first of these options, there is so far no disagreement between us; it is only the second option that EM intended to deny.

Is the second option viable in clinical psychology or psychiatry? Is it viable to apply hermeneutic methodology in clinical theory and practice while insisting that it has nothing to do with determining causal connections? Such a position was adopted in some defenses of psychoanalysis in the 1960s, as noted in EM, but I think it is untenable for the following simple reason. As a treating clinician, one presents one’s practice as creating for the patient some possibilities of change, and this implicit communication to the patient (and to whoever is paying the bill) implies an interest in causal connections of the form: if I, or you, do such and such, the chance of change is increased. It may well be compatible with this to suppose that narratives created in psychotherapy are not themselves causal hypotheses, but there has to be even here, I suggest, a weaker claim that creating a coherent and credible narrative makes a difference to a person’s level of distress, or to self-esteem, or to the feeling of self-control...