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  • Aristotelian Akrasia and Psychoanalytic Regression
  • Michael Stocker (bio)
Abstract

Many philosophers tell us that akrasia, weakness of the will, is not possible, thinking they are thus agreeing with Aristotle. I think it is possible and that Aristotle thought so, too. Many contemporaries (mis)understand Aristotelian akrasia in largely moral terms—e.g., in terms of knowingly not doing what one believes best. But he understood it in largely moral psychological terms—e.g., in terms of the nature of desire appropriate to people at different ages of their lives, and the different ways different desires interact with judgment. Central to his account of paradigmatic akrasia is what is very similar to, if not the same as, psychoanalytic regression to childish desires. Another sort of akrasia was characterized by developmentally later desires. As well as helping us understand Aristotle on akrasia, this helps us to understand his central concerns with developmental issues. It also helps us see the need ethics now has for psychoanalysis, with its central interests in development and moral psychology.

Keywords

desire, maximization, moral psychology, value, weakness of will

There is considerable controversy about Aristotle’s views on akrasia (typically translated as “weakness of will”): specifically about why and how he distinguishes among different sorts of akrasia; what sorts, if any, of akrasia he thinks possible; whether he has good reasons for his views; and, in fact, what those reasons and views are. On my view, one source of these controversies is our giving too much weight to evaluation and evaluative categories, and too little weight to psychology and psychological categories, both in accounts of decision and action and in our accounts of Aristotle.

Typical, contemporary philosophical questions about weakness of will go something like, (1) Is it possible for people knowingly not to do what they think best, and if so, how? Focusing on paradigmatic akrasia, Aristotle asked a question that seems very similar to (1): (2) Is it possible for people, because of contrary, bodily, epithumetic, desires—desires for bodily, epithumetic, pleasures—knowingly not to do what they think best, and if so how? To understand his concerns with akrasia, it will help to note two ways (2) differs importantly from (1). Aristotle recognized that other sorts of desires and other sorts of pleasures—such as the desire for and pleasure in victory or honor—might well lead people not to do what they think they should. This, too, could qualify as akrasia, but only nonparadigmatic akrasia. Aristotle also recognized that other things than pleasure—such as pain—might also lead people not to do what they think they should. But this would not be any sort of akrasia, not even nonparadigmatic akrasia.

Compared with (1), (2) is doubly restricted to just pleasures and to just some of them. Aristotle’s [End Page 231] reason for making these restrictions is not that pleasures or those pleasures have special evaluative features—for example, are especially good. Nor is it that he thinks such pleasure or pleasure in general is typical and illustrative of all reasons people might knowingly not do what they think best. Nor is it that he is concerned to answer the general evaluative question posed by (1), thinking simply that good examples for this can be had by using the desires figuring in (2). Rather, he asks (2) because of the special psychological and moral psychological features and roles its desires play in human development and life. This is to say that his concern with both paradigmatic and nonparadigmatic akrasia was not with, or not just with, the force of evaluative considerations—“How can people not do what they think best?”—but with or also with the force of desires and pleasures, especially epithumetic, bodily ones, to get people not to do what they think best. Various contemporary philosophers (e.g., Davidson [1969] and Lear [1988]) criticize Aristotle for asking (2), rather than the more general (1), and for raising the psychological and moral psychological issues of (2), rather than the more strictly evaluative issues of (1). But I think he had good reason for what he did. I also think that we have good reason to follow him.

In saying that we...

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