Due to both deepening economic crises and pressure from external lenders, Costa Rica and El Salvador implemented trade and market liberalization reforms in the 1980s. This study explores whether these policy changes shifted production toward each country’s presumed comparative advantage in agriculture. For Costa Rica, trade and market liberalization strengthened the country’s ability to generate agricultural trade surpluses while liberalization caused a decline in El Salvador’s agricultural sector. Liberalization also affected how prices and exchange rates influence agriculture in both countries. The findings demonstrate that agriculture’s response to liberalization can vary widely among countries. Overall market conditions in the rural sector, including El Salvador’s postconflict challenges, during liberalization’s introduction partly explain the different responses. Other potential factors include the pace that governments implement policy reforms and that liberalization will only stimulate agriculture if the country has a clear comparative advantage in that sector.
Liberalization, Agriculture, Central America
The debate over trade policy and development remains controversial. One key issue concerns trade liberalization’s overall impact on development, with agriculture receiving considerable attention because wealthy countries protect their domestic agricultural markets and many low-income countries (LICs) depend heavily on agriculture (Hoekman et al., 2004; Anderson, 2004). In addition, many LICs have historically protected their economies using import substitution schemes. During the 1980s policymakers in these same LICs began to implement widespread economic reforms, generally described as trade and market liberalization. Yet the precise effects of liberalization reforms on LICs’ agricultural sectors remain relatively unexplored, which is surprising given liberalization’s widespread reach and agriculture’s dominance in LIC economies.
This paper examines the impact of unilateral trade and market liberalization on agriculture in Costa Rica and El Salvador. While these two countries share similar [End Page 1] cultures, language, and geography, their general economic and political experiences are markedly different since the 1970s. The paper will explore whether these factors influence liberalization’s impact on agriculture. Section I explores the literature and important background issues. Section II describes the estimation model and methods and Section III provides estimation results. The fourth section discusses relevant policy implications, followed by an overall summary.
Background and Literature Review
Numerous sources describe how most LICs employed trade and market restrictions in the 1960s and 70s (e.g., Schiff and Valdés, 1992; Krueger et al., 1991). Such “import substitution” policies generally supported manufacturing and industrial sectors while providing disincentives to agriculture. Due to poor macroeconomic performance and pressure from foreign lenders, many LIC governments began abandoning import substitution policies in the mid-1980s. As a result, domestic markets became less distortionary and prices more closely reflected scarcity values. In many cases governments also closed marketing boards for agricultural inputs and commodities, hoping that the private sector would fill these roles. In this paper, such policy reforms are all described as trade liberalization, even though they extend beyond restrictions on international trade.
Because of relatively high population densities and the fact that agricultural goods are labor intensive, many LICs presumably have comparative advantages in agriculture. Since the basic premise behind import substitution was to shift resources away from agriculture into manufacturing through price incentives, liberalization reforms were expected to revive agricultural development and stimulate macroeconomic growth through efficient resource allocation. One potential hindrance includes historical neglect of rural infrastructure and marketing channels. In addition, both labor and capital resources might be immobile if their markets are either imperfect or omitted from liberalization reforms. As a result, many years might easily pass before liberalization results in significant agricultural growth and development. Of course, if a country’s comparative advantage is not in agriculture, liberalization is expected to shift production and exports into other sectors.
The evidence regarding trade liberalization’s effect on agriculture in specific countries shows mixed results. Some studies show that liberalization positively affects agriculture. Amin et al. (2002) find that market reforms in Cameroon improved agricultural sector profitability and subsequently boosted agricultural production. Much of the improvement in agricultural incentives stemmed from currency devaluation, which caused farmers to plant fewer subsidized crops and more traditional export crops where Cameroon enjoys a comparative advantage. Storm (2003) used a general equilibrium model to simulate agricultural trade liberalization in India and finds that agricultural price increases stimulate agricultural investment and increase agricultural yields and rural incomes. As in Cameroon, much of the improvement in agricultural price incentives in India results from domestic currency devaluation. Blake et al. (2002) examine liberalization reforms in Uganda and find improved price incentives for agriculture and welfare gains for rural households. [End Page 2]
Other studies find little or no evidence that liberalization positively affects agriculture. Quiroz and Opazo (2000) explain that even though many liberalizing countries in Latin America experienced strong agricultural output growth, agricultural import-competing sectors faced significantly more pressure than expected, primarily because real currency values did not always depreciate as expected. Jaramillo (1998) shows how Colombia’s trade liberalization program caused rapid import growth with no corresponding boost in agricultural exports. Deiniger and Olinto (2000) conclude that Zambia’s liberalization program in the early 1990s produced agricultural stagnation, mainly due to structural rigidities in the rural economy that prevented farmers from responding to improved incentives and market decentralization. Similarly, Wiggins et al. (2002) describe how the private sector did not provide credit and other agricultural inputs in rural Mexico following liberalization. Weeks (1999) finds that trade liberalization policies caused declining agricultural trade balances throughout Central America. Hossain and Alauddin (2005) conclude that Bangladesh’s liberalization program in the 1980s caused strong production and export growth of manufactured goods and reduced growth of agricultural production. Karunaratne (1998) finds similar results for Thailand.
Liberalization reforms in El Salvador and Costa Rica began in the 1980s and covered many sectors. By the late 1970s external and internal economic conditions had drastically deteriorated throughout Central America (Bulmer-Thomas, 1988), with import substitution policies encouraging substantial rent-seeking behavior while providing limited social benefits (Agosin and Ffrench-Davis, 1993). These conditions, coupled with pressure from external lenders, provided the impetus for market liberalization in the 1980s.
The specific liberalization policies in Costa Rica and El Salvador resembled each other in content but policymakers implemented them differently in each country. The Costa Rican government gradually implemented liberalization reforms over a ten year period (Weeks; Evans, 2001; Taylor and Thorpe, 2001; Moreno-Brid and Pérez, 2003). Starting in 1982 with relaxed foreign exchange controls and culminating in a free floating currency, the external financial sector experienced significant liberalization. In addition, average import tariffs declined during this period from over 100 percent to 25 percent and quantity restrictions on trade were converted to tariffs. GATT membership followed in 1990. Liberalization of the banking and financial sectors began in 1984 and included the central bank’s new focus on price stability, privatization of state-owned banks, elimination of interest rate controls, and close supervision of financial institutions. By contrast, El Salvador’s reforms began in 1989 and were fully complete after just several years. El Salvador became a GATT member in 1991. However, El Salvador’s financial reforms did not extend to the foreign exchange market, as the colón was pegged to the dollar in 1994 and the use of US dollars was officially approved in 2001 (IMF, 2006). The two countries also differ in their income per capita, economic growth, and political situation: Costa Rica’s gross domestic product per capita exceeded El Salvador’s by 50 percent in 1980 and grew to twice that of El Salvador by 2000 (World Bank, 2007). El Salvador also experienced intense civil conflict in the 1980s while Costa Rica was peaceful and democratic during this period. [End Page 3]
Methods and Data Description
This study employs Weeks’ model of the agricultural sector and trade liberalization. The basic model yields the following estimable equation:1
net agricultural exports, relative to total agricultural output in year t
the real exchange rate, measured in local currency units per US$, in year t
the ratio of agricultural to nonagricultural prices in year t
the share of agricultural output in total output in year t
binary variable equal to 1 if the country’s trade policies are liberalized in year t
binary variable equal to 1 if the country is experiencing conflict in year t
stochastic error term in year t
The AGTRADE variable also reflects a country’s production and trade specialization under liberalized markets. Following Weeks, agricultural goods in LICs are assumed both tradable and labor intensive. Given that most LICs are relatively labor abundant, LICs enjoy a comparative advantage in agricultural goods so that trade liberalization policies increase net agricultural exports.3 Hence, the coefficient on POL should show a positive sign in countries with comparative advantages in agriculture. Conversely, countries with comparative advantages in other sectors would experience a decline in AGTRADE following liberalization. Exceptions occur when countries with [End Page 4] comparative advantages in agriculture face stiff trade restrictions abroad for their exports, so that liberalization increases agricultural imports with no gain in agricultural exports.
When the domestic currency depreciates in real terms (RER rises) agricultural exports become more competitive abroad and agricultural imports more costly, suggesting that the coefficient on RER is positive.4 To the extent that resources are mobile and domestic output price responsive, an increase in agricultural prices (RPAM) should increase both agricultural output and net agricultural exports. As overall dependence on agriculture (SHGDP) rises, net agricultural exports as a share of total agricultural output should also rise. Assuming that domestic conflict increases risk to farmers and disrupts input and commodity markets, the expected sign on CONF is negative. The partial adjustment model described in the appendix shows that the coefficient on AGTRADEt−1 measures the speed of equilibrium adjustment, where 0 < (1- a4 = γ) <1, with γ being the adjustment coefficient. As γ approaches unity the trade balance adjusts to equilibrium more quickly.
To improve on Weeks’ original estimation model, liberalization can potentially affect price and exchange rate elasticities over time: [End Page 5]
where TIME is an annual linear index starting at 0 the first year trade liberalization begins.
Statistical tests revealed that the variables in
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which allow the exchange rate and price effects on agricultural trade to vary following the introduction of liberalization. This estimation structure is plausible since liberalization generally implies that the economy relies more on price signals to distribute resources between agriculture and other sectors.
Regarding the non-policy related variables, the size of the agricultural sector (SHGDP) does not affect the agricultural trade balance in either country. This finding differs from Weeks who finds a significant positive impact for Central America as a whole. It is not clear whether Weeks’ result stems from using a different estimation model than
The direct effects of liberalization on agricultural trade differ dramatically between the two countries. Trade liberalization in Costa Rica initially produces a large increase in the agricultural trade balance of roughly 70 percentage points, while liberalization in El Salvador initially causes a decline of nearly 20 percentage points.
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In reality, Figure 2 shows that liberalization’s impact on agriculture changes little in either country, with almost no change in Costa Rica and a doubling of the initial negative effect in El Salvador only after 13 years. [End Page 9]
Discussion and Implications
Several explanations emerge for the effects of trade liberalization on agriculture shown in Figure 2. Weeks contends that the negative impact of liberalization on agriculture in Central America stems from real currency appreciation and declining agricultural prices. While these phenomena did occur during the past 20 years for both Costa Rica and El Salvador, Weeks’ interpretation is incorrect since trade liberalization is a separate factor [End Page 10] from prices and the exchange rate in
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Costa Rica shows a very different pattern from El Salvador since liberalization positively affects the agricultural trade balance. Figure 4 shows that agricultural exports steadily grew following trade liberalization in 1982. One possible explanation is that Costa Rica’s relatively advanced state of development and absence of conflict helped support agricultural input and commodity markets during liberalization reforms. These results also suggest that Costa Rica enjoys comparative advantages in agricultural goods.
The above factors still do not explain the tremendous growth in El Salvador’s agricultural trade deficit after 2000 (Figure 3). Agricultural markets should have begun to function 10 years following the conflict and thereby producing an increase in net agricultural exports. However, agricultural exports fell sharply after 2000 while imports continued to soar. El Salvador’s fixed exchange rate partly explains this result. Figure 5 confirms that the real value of the Salvadoran colón steadily appreciated after 2000, which created disincentives for agricultural exports and incentives for agricultural imports. Figure 5 also shows that agricultural prices increased slightly in El Salvador after 2000 and ceteris paribus this would have induced an agricultural trade surplus. Figure 1 shows that the exchange rate’s impact on agricultural trade is much greater than for agricultural prices if both variables move 10 years after liberalization. Hence, the net impact of real currency depreciation on El Salvador’s agricultural trade balance after 2000 was negative. [End Page 12]
Previous studies support the notion that microeconomic and structural conditions can hamper agricultural growth and development during liberalization. Deininger and Olinto find that large gaps in input availability hurt Zambian farmers’ ability to respond to new opportunities post liberalization. Wiggins et al. express some of the same concerns for rural Mexico. Quiroz and Opazo similarly report how persistent lack of property rights in South America during early liberalization years provided strong disincentives for agricultural investment. Schiff and Montenegro (1997) explain how structural changes, including price policies, can render supply elasticity estimates irrelevant so that liberalization may not produce the expected gains in short run agricultural output.
The above findings also address the optimal sequencing and pace of liberalization. To avoid the kind of damage to agriculture that occurred in El Salvador, policymakers should address rural microeconomic shortcomings before enacting broad liberalization reforms. This point especially pertains to credit and input markets. Evans explains how financial sector reform throughout Central America reduced credit access for small to medium businesses, which would naturally include farmers. Thus, it is plausible that poor credit access by farmers in El Salvador negated some of the potential [End Page 13] gains to agriculture following liberalization. In addition, Costa Rica’s use of gradual liberalization reforms and their resulting positive impact on agriculture suggest that policymakers should view rapid “shock-type” liberalization reforms with skepticism.
Another important question is how these two countries’ agricultural sectors would respond to global trade liberalization. By one estimate (Beghin and Aksoy, 2003), an agreement at the Doha negotiations of the World Trade Organization would increase global agricultural prices by 10 to 90 percent, depending on the commodity and any related assumptions. Figure 1 suggests that the agricultural sectors in both Costa Rica and El Salvador would benefit from these price increases.
This study finds that trade liberalization can either positively or negatively affect agriculture in low income countries depending on the specific economic conditions. Liberalization stimulated agriculture in Costa Rica while El Salvador’s agricultural sector negatively reacted to liberalization. These findings emphasize that low income countries’ response to liberalization should be modeled as unique processes. The most likely explanation for the different results in Costa Rica and El Salvador is the overall state of economic development in each country, which would have affected the operation of agricultural markets. Costa Rica’s economy was stable and relatively advanced when its liberalization reforms began, while an intense civil conflict had just ended in El Salvador prior to liberalization reforms. The results also reflect that Costa Rica likely enjoys comparative advantages in agriculture while liberalization in El Salvador encouraged resource flows away from agriculture. Another factor is that El Salvador rapidly implemented its liberalization reforms, which was not the case in Costa Rica.
The authors wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful insights and comments. However, all content remains the sole responsibility of the authors.
1. The appendix describes the complete model.
2. Assuming the country is sufficiently small so that its trade volume does not affect world prices.
3. Measuring the agricultural trade balance relative to total agricultural output helps eliminate wide variations in the trade balance arising from stochastic production shocks.
4. Exceptions occur if export supply or import demand elasticities are sufficiently small according to the Marshal-Lerner conditions.
5. Complete results are available from the authors on request.
Tests for long-run cointegration among all variables use
Following Weeks’ original model, the equilibrium agricultural trade balance (in ratio form) is a log-linear expression:
equilibrium agricultural exports in year t
equilibrium agricultural imports in year t
the real exchange rate, measured in local currency units per US$, in year t
the ratio of agricultural to nonagricultural prices in year t
the share of agricultural output in total output in year t
Each period’s change in the trade balance is a partial adjustment process toward equilibrium:
One important difference in
As Weeks explains, it is preferable for estimation purposes to use the ratio of the agricultural trade balance to total agricultural output in place of ln[Xnt] to avoid large swings in the dependent variable when the trade balance changes from positive to negative. Hence, the estimable equation, before adding policy and conflict variables, becomes:
where AGTRADE represents net agricultural exports, relative to total agricultural output, and εt is a stochastic error term in year t. [End Page 15]