Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945 (review)

In this sequel to his award-winning 2003 study, Fields of Fire, Terry Copp continues his efforts to expand awareness regarding the effectiveness and contribution of Canadian forces to Allied victory in Northwest Europe via a narrative of Canadian ground combat operations. He largely succeeds in demonstrating that the challenges that confronted the Canadians have been underemphasized; that criticisms leveled at them are exaggerated or unfounded; and that Canadians made a greater contribution to Allied victory than is often recognized.

The author contends that the Canadian capture of the Channel ports of Le Havre, Boulogne, and Calais were significant accomplishments that were not appropriately recognized at the time or subsequently. Copp illustrates that the challenges that confronted the Canadians have been unappreciated and thus the criticisms leveled against them for the time it took to clear the ports are unwarranted. Equally, the challenges the Canadians faced clearing the Breskens Pocket were also substantial, yet his claim that the struggle "must surely rank with the most difficult fight by any Allied formation in the Second World War" (p. 117) over reaches. The argument that the Canadians never received the resources necessary to rapidly clear the Scheldt – thereby opening up the port of Antwerp - is true, but hardly novel. Copp rightly emphasizes the enormous pressure and strain placed on the front line Canadian infantry during the fall 1944 battles (p. 177). Also compelling is his argument that "senior Canadian officers…were flexible as well as open to innovation" (p. 196). His emphasis on the scale and tremendous cost of the spring 1945 operations is likewise spot on, as is his claim that "…military historians have generally paid slight attention to the operations carried out by First Canadian Army in April 1945" (p. 261). His exploration of the Canadian clearing of Arnhem, Leer, Groningen, and the Delfzijl Pocket provide much needed study of these neglected late war battles.

Among the study's most original conclusions are that improvements in artillery effectiveness "were less satisfactory than usually supposed" and that "casualties from friendly fire were much higher than is generally supposed" (pp. 290-91). The greatest strength of the work is its synthetic value, bringing together conclusions that the author and other scholars have articulated over the last decade. The work naturally has limitations. As a narrative of Canadian ground combat operations, only intermittently does the author engage some of the specific criticisms other historians have leveled at Canadian performance in Northwest Europe. Moreover, Copp overrates German capability. In reality, German deficiencies and weaknesses invariably exceeded Canadian, sometimes significantly so. The most striking case is the author's description of the Breskens Pocket, where Copp conveys the impression that the Canadians faced a regular, experienced, powerful German 64th Infantry Division. In actuality, the formation was recently activated, hastily assembled, second rate, not very mobile, and inexperienced. Moreover, that the under-resourced Canadians innovated is neither novel nor surprising. Insufficient resources to accomplish assigned missions invariably compel militaries to adapt on the battlefield and innovation was characteristic of all the combatants in Northwest Europe. An important historical question has been not whether the Canadians innovated, but how rapidly and successfully they did it relative to their British and American allies, and their German opponents. These minor criticisms notwithstanding, Copp has produced a well-researched, well-presented, largely compelling, and much needed corrective that emphasizes the tremendous challenges, the very substantial human cost, and the significant contribution Canadian forces made to Allied victory in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945. It should be on the shelf of anyone interested in the Second World War.