The March to Kandahar: Roberts in Afghanistan (review)

The sleeve notes to this overview of General Frederick Roberts's role during the 2nd Anglo-Afghan war of 1878-80 rather ill-advisedly state that readers might seek to draw parallels between the British Army's involvement in Afghanistan then and now. To anyone familiar with events in late nineteenth century Afghanistan, that period, certain generalities aside, serves little purpose in any serious analysis of current operations and as such any crude historical comparisons are probably best left to one side.

Initial irritation, however, is short lived. Atwood has produced a neat and concise appraisal of Roberts's time in Afghanistan. From his initial command of one of the three columns of troops that fought their way into Afghanistan in 1878, his subsequent capture, pacification and administration of Kabul and its environs, and of course, in August 1880, the action for which he was most famous: a march of 313 miles in 23 days by 10,000 men, from Kabul to the besieged garrison at Kandahar. The relief of Kandahar provided succour to British forces and public alike, still smarting over the humiliation at Maiwand some weeks previously, when almost an entire Brigade of British-Indian troops was destroyed by an Afghan force under the command of Ayub Khan, rival to the British favoured Abdur Rahman. Khan's subsequent defeat at the hands of Roberts rescued British prestige and allowed subsequent withdrawal from Afghanistan with head held high and honour intact.

The March to Kandahar is not intended to provide an in-depth account of the events of 1878-80. Others have already covered that ground in some detail and, as a consequence, those already intimately acquainted with late nineteenth century Afghan affairs are unlikely to find anything here of real note. Atwood's stated scope is conservative, focusing specifically on Roberts. As such, this new study is even handed and well informed. The author's favourable impression of Robert's generalship is balanced by a less than admiring appreciation of his grasp of Afghan politics and a rather condemnatory analysis of his actions at Kabul where, under the instructions of Lord Lytton, Viceroy of India, Roberts ordered the execution of over 100 Afghans suspected of involvement in the murder of the British envoy, Major Louis Cavagnari. Yet, Kabul aside, perhaps only Roberts could have subsequently motivated his men to make that historic march to Kandahar and it is this duality that Atwood emphasises – a military commander whose willingness to 'get the job done' resulted in often extraordinarily harsh measures directed at the enemy but whose martial qualities, allied to his obvious compassion and concern for his own men, British and Indian, rewarded him with such popular appeal and professional success.

Atwood claims to be preparing a biography of Roberts. In some ways this book leaves one wishing that his time in Afghanistan should have been placed in the context of a full and illustrious career. Such an important and complex character deserves such attention to detail and his subsequent role as strategic commentator on frontier strategy, his rivalry with fellow Imperial soldier Garnet Wolseley and his command of Empire forces during the 2nd Anglo-Boer war, all only hinted at here by Atwood, emphasise that only one part of the story of this remarkable soldier has been told. Let us hope that when Atwood tells the whole tale, he does so in the same style as The March to Kandahar.