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  • Strategic Studies: A Reader
  • J. Boone Bartholomees
Strategic Studies: A Reader. Edited by Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo. Abingdon, U.K., and New York: Routledge, 2008. ISBN 978-0-415-77222-8. Notes. Index. Pp. ix, 450. $180.00 (pb).

Thomas Mahnken, formerly of the US Naval War College and currently Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, and Joseph Maiolo of King's College, London, edited this reader on strategy. The book is aimed at professional military practitioners and other students of strategic studies, international security, and modern war. It is divided thematically into six sections ranging from the uses of strategic theory through specifc strategic issues such as nuclear strategy to a concluding discussion of the future of war and strategy. A brief editors' introduction sets up each section. The volume mixes classic theoretical selections with modern scholarship and provides case studies to leaven hardcore theory. The book is interdisciplinary in approach and content, touching on theory, history, and political science.

As with any work of this type, the key to utility is the selection of articles, and again as is common for the genre, the editors reflect their unique perspectives in their selection. In general, the chapters in Strategic Studiesare very good—often the best available on their topics. Nevertheless, there is heavy emphasis on certain subjects or perspectives at the expense of competing or alternative points of view. For example, the section on classic theorists contains essentially all the strategically relevant portions of Sun Tzu, three and a half pages of Liddell Hart that summarize his indirect approach, and a classic chapter from Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence. One cannot argue with any of those; however, the absence of Clausewitz from a section on classic strategy is puzzling. The editors acknowledge in their introduction to the section that their selections should be studied in relation to Clausewitz, and anyone familiar with Clausewitz will immediately recognize the difficulty of selecting a single reading of reasonable length to represent the Prussian theorist. Nevertheless, a short Clausewitzian piece or something from a modern interpreter might have enriched the volume.

Similarly, one might question the selections in the section titled "Instruments of war: land, sea and air power." The land power reading is a largely tactical piece [End Page 933]about J. F. C. Fuller's armored theory. The selection on sea power is a chapter from Julian Corbett's Principles of Maritime Strategythat discusses limited war versus unlimited war. Two articles present air power—one arguing that early air power was a foundation of deterrence, and the other Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman's excellent study of the Kosovo war arguing that air power works best in conjunction with the other mediums. One might have expected something more strategic on land power. The Corbett reading is interesting, but does not represent sea power as well as the chapter that immediately follows it in Corbett's book: "Theory of the Object—Command of the Sea." A reading by, for example, John Warden might have been more useful in the air power discussion than the article on air power deterrence theory before 1939, especially since deterrence theory receives heavy emphasis in several other sections of the reader.

Conversely, the editors have done an exceptional job in two of the most important and contemporarily interesting subject areas. The long section on irregular warfare and small wars includes great selections from T. E. Lawrence and Mao Zedong on insurgency theory. This is complemented by chapters from David Galula on counterinsurgency theory and Andrew Mack's essay "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict." Two excellent articles with different perspectives on modern global terrorism round out this section.

The second section of current interest is on "Future Warfare, Future Strategy." While Andrew Krepinevich's article on revolutions in military affairs might be questioned, the other four readings in this section are excellent. Colin Gray's "Why is Strategy Difcult", Adam Roberts's "Te 'War on Terror' in Historical Perspective", and Hew Strachan's "Te Lost Meaning of Strategy" approach classic status.

Overall, Strategic Studies: a Readeris a positive addition to the...

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