Kennedy, Castro, and Capos

John F. Kennedy's policies toward Cuba and Vietnam have evinced steady attention from scholars for decades. Howard Jones, having written about Kennedy and Vietnam in Death of a Generation (2003), now intensely scrutinizes the failed attempt to remove Fidel Castro from power in April 1961. Jones argues that Kennedy's backing of this Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) scheme "set the tone" for his subsequent foreign policy and "provided a model for succeeding administrations" who confronted leaders deemed "threats to the Free World and hence to American security" (pp. 3–4).

Jones begins his largely narrative account with Castro's successful revolution against dictator Fulgencio Batista in January 1959, which initially inspired optimism in some quarters of the United States. The Eisenhower administration, however, soon worried that the new Cuban regime would inspire other nationalist movements in Latin America and threaten U.S. interests in the region. These fears mounted in December 1959 when CIA Director Allen Dulles warned that "Cuba was drifting toward Communism," and assassination plots and coup plans quickly began taking shape (p. 12). As Jones notes, Eisenhower had favored covert action since the early days of his presidency, using the CIA to topple governments in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954). While contemplating Castro's removal, moreover, he sought to eliminate Patrice Lumumba and his government in the Republic of the Congo. The power and trust he placed in the agency led some to dub his presidency the golden age of covert action.

Much of the appeal of covert action rested in the concept of plausible deniability. While suspicions of U.S. culpability would always exist, a well-executed plan could not be traced directly back to the president. If, for some reason, CIA participation became apparent, the opportunity to scapegoat "rogue" elements in the agency still existed. All covert operations thus employed "cutouts," corporations or individuals who would act as intermediaries so that government personnel could keep their distance from questionable or even criminal activity. Jones details how in 1960 the CIA sponsored two intertwined operations to topple Castro—invasion by anti-Castro Cubans and a Mafia-led assassination plot. The agency contacted former Federal Bureau of Investigation agent Robert Maheu, who utilized his friendship with mobster Johnny Roselli to enlist fellow Mafia figures Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante in the scheme. The mob wanted revenge against Castro after he shuttered their profitable Cuban gambling and prostitution operations. Richard Bissell, CIA deputy director of plans, hoped that Castro's assassination would inspire a popular uprising that would topple the decapitated regime. Jones makes a convincing case that, despite all the euphemisms ("executive action" and "elimination" among others), Eisenhower knew that the agency sought to assassinate Castro.

As Eisenhower left office in January 1961, he broke diplomatic relations with Cuba and bequeathed Kennedy the anti-Castro covert actions he had authorized. Jones offers evidence that Operation Trinidad, the code-name for the planned exile invasion, could no longer be accurately defined as covert in early 1961. Word of the plan had circulated widely in the Cuban exile community, and Castro's double agents had warned him of U.S. intentions. News reports had already circulated about the training camp for Cuban exiles that the CIA had established in Guatemala, and few gave credence to the standard denials from the U.S. and Guatemalan governments.

Yet Kennedy plunged forward with both the invasion and assassination plots. He had blasted Eisenhower for allowing a hostile regime to emerge so close to American shores and vowed to take action if he became president. Jones details Kennedy's early embrace of the assassination plots and his quick approval of an expanded program dubbed ZR/RIFLE. Kennedy conversely feared that U.S. responsibility for the exile invasion would be blatantly obvious, and he worried about military assessments that the plan had only a fair chance of success. Still, he dreaded the consequences of cancelling it. Ending the exiles' training would allow them to return to the United States and publicly...