Greece in World War II to April 1941 (review)

Reviews 267 probably have ordered the use of American troops. All this to the contrary notwithstanding, Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944—1949 is an important work. R. V. Burks Wayne State University John G. Bitzes, Greece in World War II to April 1941. Yuma, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1989. Pp. xxiii + 214. $29.95. This is a short account of the Italian attack on Greece in October 1940, the Greek victory, British intervention, and finally the German attack in April 1941. There is no doubt that the author has thought deeply about these events and their causes, and the book is worth reading, not least because the reader is constandy reminded of the larger strategic and political background to the events in Greece. Sadly, this account also has some serious flaws. While the book is full of interesting arguments and information, it frustrates the reader because the text is not supported by proper references. This shortcoming means that the book cannot be considered a scholarly history , although it is clearly intended to be that. The author announces (p. ix) that "the diplomatic papers of the United Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United States were all carefully studied," but nearly all notes to unpublished documents are of the following type: "Great Britain: Foreign Office Archives" or "U.S.: State Department Archives"—which is no help at all. References to books normally (but not always) do have page numbers. After a brief account of Greek history in the 20th century, chapter 2 presents a central argument of the book: that without the Metaxás regime "Greece would not have been ready for the role she was forced to play against the Axis" (p. 13). Bitzes believes that most of the honor for the surprising achievements of the Greek army belongs to the Greek dictator, Ioánnis Metaxás, whose strategic wisdom and military realism is much praised. Bitzes is well aware that his admiration for Metaxás is not likely to appeal to all readers. However, he contends that he is merely presenting the historical truth, however uncomfortable. Few historians would deny that Metaxás played a crucial role in the decision-making which brought Greece into the war against Italy; whether his regime should also receive credit for the heroism that won this war is anodier matter. (Indeed Bitzes himself seems to have some doubts on this point.) However, his admiration for Metaxás leads him to believe that "the Greek people by and large had accepted the August 4th regime" (p. 14) and he even finds some good words for the police chief, Maniadákis: "by 1939 Greece could boast of one of the lowest crime rates in the world." Chapter 3, entided "Mare Nostrum," describes Mussolini's dream of turn- 268 Reviews ing the Mediterranean into an Italian lake. No doubt Bitzes is right in saying that when the Italians invaded Greece on 28 October 1940, "the Greeks were expected to collapse after token resistance" (p. xviii). The fact that they did not collapse and instead defeated the Italians was surely an event of major importance for the course of the World War. Bitzes argues that the contribution of Greece to the eventual defeat of the dictators tends to be underrated. Perhaps he is right, but such things are hard to measure. Metaxás had been known since the Balkan Wars as a hard-headed military realist, and he can have had few illusions about Greece's short-term military chances against the Axis powers. So why did he decide to fight in October 1940? Bitzes rightly emphasizes that Greece was being pushed from all sides. He seems to think (p. 78-79) that the best explanation for the decision to resist the Italian aggression is that given by Metaxás himself at a meeting with Athenian newspaper editors two days after the attack, on 30 October. The dictator's arguments may be summarized thus: 1) While Greece had done "everything permissible and possible" to avoid having to fight, Hitler had advised him that Greece, to avoid war, should surrender territories to Italy and Bulgaria. 2) If Greece had indeed surrendered in this way (Metaxás said), "it...