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Reviews 145 why did they agree to the expedition against their better judgment? Higham dismisses Dill as weak and concentrates on Wavell, who he argues fully understood the domestic and international political pressures on the British Prime Minister to achieve a victory against the Axis. The goal was to create a Balkan front of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. Wavell believed that preparations and aid to Greece could be a catalyst for the front, but unlike Churchill he never lost sight of his first priority to protect his recent gains in the Western front against Italy. Higham makes a leap of imagination and claims that Wavell believed he could solidify the Balkan front with "a gallant gesture at almost no cost at all" (p. 236). Since he could read the German preparations for the invasion through ULTRA, Higham contends that Wavell intended to time the arrival of the British expeditionary forces to coincide with the German crossing of the Greek frontier from Bulgaria. If the front had crystalized by that time, there would be chance of success against the German attacks. But if the front had not been formed, he would be able to evacuate his force safely and intact to Egypt. The scheme went awry because of bad weather and German delays which pushed the German attack back into April. This interpretation is unlikely to go unchallenged. Although the Greek side is not a major focus of the book, Higham offers a defense of Metaxas and General Papagos. On the controversial issue of whether Papagos agreed in his February 22 talks with Eden to defend the Metaxas Line on the Bulgarian border or to withdraw to the preferred British positions along the Mt. Vermion-Mt. Olimbos line (Aliákmon Line) west of Thessaloniki, Higham comes down solidly on the side of Papagos. "Historically, General Papagos' version of the events between 22 February and 2 March on this point is absolutely correct and the British accounts are not" (p. 132). Higham rests his case on official Greek documents published in 1980, but his interpretation lacks depth and complexity. On occasion the thread of Higham's story is lost in a welter of references to types of weapons, munitions, troop dispostions, squadrons , and lists of matériel, but the book is a useful and detailed account of the disastrous British decision to aid Greece. John L. Hondros The College of Wooster George N. Yannopoulos (editor), Greece and the EEC. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1986. Pp. xii + 178. This book contains papers presented at a conference held at the University of Reading (UK) in March 1984. Greek and British authors 146 Reviews examine the economic effects of Greece's membership in the European Community (EC) during the first three years after accession (1981—83). Greece's experience is treated as a case-study of the effects of a common market involving countries at different stages of economic development. This leads to some general conclusions about the future of the Community of Twelve and, more specifically, about the likely effects of the Iberian enlargement of the EC. The volume contains an ex ante evaluation of the likely macroeconomic effects of Greece's accession based on an econometric model of the whole economy. This simulation exercise is followed by a qualitative analysis of actual changes in government economic policies and their effect on economic developments. A general chapter on Greece's balance of payments and the impact of EC membership is complemented by two other chapters concentrating on the manufacturing and the agricultural sectors. A third sectoral study deals with shipping. The book returns again to macroeconomic issues to examine Greece's possible membership in the European Monetary System (EMS). The concluding chapter considers policy implications and advocates a policy of export-oriented growth as the only appropriate policy for Greece to follow in the context of the EC. This collective exercise in assessing the economic impact of Greece's accession to the EC—undoubtedly, the most important event in many years for the external relations of the country—entails certain risks and limitations. The dynamic effects of accession extend over a relatively long period of time; hence conclusions drawn from the experience...


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