British Policy towards Greece during the Second World War 1941-1944 (review)

164 Reviews In an odd way, the historical articles in this first issue leave Greece proper pretty much on the sidelines. The literary articles do something to adjust that balance, since they all concern Greek writers and literary expression. I do not feel competent to pass judgement on the translation of Solomos' The Women of Zakynthos by Peter Colaclides and Michael Green, nor can I evaluate an article on the symbolism of Takis Papatsonis' poetry by Kostas Myrsiades, other than to say that the language the author uses is impenetrable to the uninitiated. Eugene McCarthy on George Seferis, by contrast, is a lucid, delightful tribute from a man known more for his political than for his poetical career. L. S. Myrsiades on the Karaghiozis and their use of history, together with an article appraising two works by Andreas Karkavitsas by William Wyatt and a brief tribute to Theodore Saloutos by Rudolph Vecoli complete the table of contents of this issue. Overall, the Yearbook is a fine sample of what Greek scholarship is like. The editor is to be congratulated, and time will tell whether the Yearbook and the JMGS can both maintain the level of quality each seeks to establish. William H. McNeill University of Chicago Procopis Papastratis, British Policy towards Greece during the Second World War 1941-1944. Cambridge University Press 1984. Pp. 274, £25. "Greek politics is a hot and sticky porridge and I abhor the idea of putting my finger into this mess." This remark by Anthony Eden (made in November 1941) will probably seem justified to many readers of Procopis Papastratis' detailed study of Anglo-Greek relations during the occupation of Greece and it is quoted there (p. 23). On several occasions the fortunes of Greece have been profoundly influenced by Britain, but British influence was probably more important during the Second World War than at any other time. If Britain had then abstained from direct and energetic intervention in Greece (as she did abstain, reluctantly, in the rest of the Balkans) political conditions in Greece today would almost certainly be very different from what they are. Reviews 165 The theme of Procopis Papastratis' book is thus a very important one for Greek history, and it fully deserves the kind of detailed study and analysis which he has provided. It seems to this reviewer, however, that his time-limits are uncomfortably narrow: the book begins after the German victory over the Greeks and the British expeditionary force in April 1941, and it ends before the British armed intervention in Athens in December 1944. Thus it covers a somewhat shorter span than is implied by the title. This may not matter too much, as specialist readers, for whom the book is clearly intended , will be familiar with the problems concerning the British aid to Greece in 1941 and the decision to oppose ELAS in late 1944. Both were costly and difficult decisions for the British, and they are important also for the understanding of the period covered in this book which is, essentially, a history of Anglo-Greek relations during the Italian and German occupation. In a long opening chapter entitled "Cairo and London," Papastratis describes, in often minute detail, British attempts to persuade the exiled Greek Government and King George II to behave as the British thought they must, if they were to have any chances of returning to power in Greece. In the chapter 2, "The King and the Government in Cairo," Papastratis concentrates on the several crises among the Greek politicians and the highly politicized Greek soldiers in the Middle East. He shows that the British had few illusions about the personal suitability of King George for the role of National Symbol which they tried to make him play, but the point is rightly emphasized that the British in spite of this never seem to have wavered in their support for the King. Chapter 3 is concerned with the terrible famine in occupied Greece. In a careful discussion, Papastratis argues that the British authorities were well aware of the awful consequences and that it was a combination of political and humanitarian reasons which led them to accept eventually an agreement under which Swedish ships...