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212 Reviews Turkish relations. It is also a sad commentary on the rise and demise of a once prosperous and influential minority that contributed so much to the development of the Ottoman Empire and of Republican Turkey. Van Coufoudakis Indiana University—Purdue University, Fort Wayne James Barros. Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions: Ethiopia, 1935-1936. New Jersey: Humanities Press Inc., 1982. Pp. 248. $35.50. The Italo-Ethiopian crisis of 1935-1936 and the growing threat from Italy, in conjunction with the apparent loosening of the Balkan Entente, led Greece to seek Great Power support to counter Italian designs. Britain was engaged at this time in a parallel policy towards Italy. The British backed the League of Nations in its quarrel with Italy over Ethiopia, and at the same time supported a conciliatory policy towards Italy. An agreement with Italy in the Mediterranean was supported by the Services, but the Foreign Office was very much concerned over the effect of such an agreement on Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Greece, in particular, was exceedingly sensitive to any alterations in relative British and Italian strengths in the Mediterranean . The Ethiopia crisis had revealed to the British government the glaring deficiencies of British power and potentialities in an uncertain international situation. There were strong arguments for a conciliatory policy towards Italy, and equally strong arguments for assurances to Greece and the other small Mediterranean states backing the League against Italy. This problem, incidentally, did not come to an end with the conquest of Ethiopia by the Italians. Greece faced a similar dilemma. The Greek government wanted to co-operate with the British against Italian designs in the Eastern Mediterranean, and at the same time wished to avoid provoking Italy. The sanctions policy of Greece estranged Italy and increased Greek insecurity. The Greek Services, especially the Navy, were apprehensive of the Italian menace and considered British assurances insufficient and vague. Greece, they argued, could not depend for her safety on Britain's promise to come to her assistance, were she to become a victim of Italian aggression. What was vital for Greece was not belated assistance after an Italian attack, but rather the prevention of such an attack. And as long as British naval and air Reviews 213 forces could not be stationed in appropriate positions in Greece, prevention of an Italian attack was impossible. The Greek government of the time, however, as well as its successor, was never able to impress on the British this vital point. Britain needed a friendly Greece, not an allied Greece, so as not to undertake undesirable commitments , but also in order to avoid further provoking Italy. Greece's attachment to Britain and British promises of support for Greece developed amidst a serious and prolonged political crisis in the latter, which led to the restoration of the monarchy in the person of pro-British King George II. Professor Barros examines all these developments on the basis of ample documentary material drawn from the state archives of Britain, Italy, Germany, Greece and the United States. The book opens with a long but useful introduction to Italo-Greek relations and areas of conflict after World War I and until the period under examination. Greek attitude towards Catholic and generally non-Orthodox activities in Greece (5159 ), although interesting to the specialist in ecclesiastical affairs, does not add much to the understanding of Italo-Greek relations; nor are, for that matter, the appraisals of related issues by the American and British Ministers in Greece the best. The treatment of internal Greek political developments in the 1920s, although based on general histories and not on recent well-documented monographs dealing with various aspects of Greek history, is generally sound (10-11); which is not the case when the author examines the supposed Italian complicity in the Venizelist abortive revolt of March 1935. The author makes much of diplomatic rumors and inferences to show Italian complicity in the revolt (34-51), which however needs further investigation and more concrete evidence. Foreign intervention in Greek internal affairs, although not exactly invented by historians, is a rather elusive subject. In the case of the Venizelist revolt of 1935, moreover, one must not forget that...

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