Lincoln and His Admirals: Abraham Lincoln, the U.S. Navy, and the Civil War (review)

Lincoln and His Admirals is an important book. It is easily the most comprehensive study to date on the development of Union naval strategy during the Civil War. Meticulously researched from primary sources, it concentrates on President Abraham Lincoln's role in the naval war. It ranges from the debate over the attempt to relieve Fort Sumter–an action that began the shooting war-to the president's role in the destruction of the Confederate James River Squadron in early April 1865. Much has been written on the relationship of Lincoln and his generals; now we have the same for Lincoln and his admirals. Anyone wishing to understand the naval Civil War and its relation to the fighting on land will want to read this book.

Craig L. Symonds is Professor Emeritus of the U.S. Naval Academy and a distinguished naval historian. Symonds has written ten books, among them a biography of Confederate Rear Admiral Franklin Buchanan. His most recent book, Decision at Sea: Five Naval Battles that Shaped American History, won the Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin D. Roosevelt Prize in 2006.

Throughout, Symonds's concentration is on Lincoln and his growth as a naval strategist and commander-in-chief. Those looking for details of naval engagements may be disappointed. Thus there is a lengthy discussion of the decision to establish bases on the Atlantic periphery of the Confederacy, but the actual Union capture of Port Royal, North Carolina, is covered in only one paragraph.

Symonds makes clear that as on land, Lincoln–who had scant military experience himself–was at first reluctant to interject himself into decision making. He did not come to the presidency, or to the war for that matter, with any fixed plan. Like Queen Elizabeth I of England, he sought to give full play to the influence of time. As Symonds notes, Lincoln's "genius derived more from what might be labeled inspired patience than from insistent direction." The press of events would not always permit this approach, however; necessity forced Lincoln into key decisions, beginning with the blockade of the Confederacy.

The war also demonstrated Lincoln's pragmatic approach to problem solving. Throughout, he showed that he would not be constrained by established doctrine. Lincoln absorbed specialist knowledge and embraced new technology. He was, for example, a regular visitor to the Washington Naval Yard, where he discussed the development of naval weapons and formed a bond with the yard's commanding officer, Commander John A. Dahlgren.

Lincoln was fortunate in his selection of Gideon Welles as secretary of the navy. Lincoln properly valued Welles for his candor and administrative skills. At the same time, however, the president took a keen interest in appointments and also on occasion took the lead in issuing orders, including one that led to the recapture of the Norfolk Navy Yard. His most notable naval failure came late in the war with the 1864 Red River Expedition. The greatest combined arms effort of the war, it almost brought the destruction of Rear Admiral David D. Porter's Mississippi Squadron. In this case at least, Lincoln was motivated more by political than military considerations: seeking to secure southwestern cotton for the New England textile mills and bolster his chances in the fall 1864 election.

Symonds is an engaging writer and his vivid word portraits of leading Union naval figures such as Welles; Assistant Secretary Gustavus Vasa Fox; and Admirals Dahlgren, David G. Farragut, Samuel F. Du Pont, David D. Porter, and Andrew H. Foote are outstanding. Anyone interested in the Civil War at sea will profit from reading this book and will want it in their personal library.