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  • Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription
  • Daniel Whiting (bio)

I. Introduction

According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for an expression to have a particular meaning or express a certain concept is for subjects to be disposed to make, or to treat as proper, certain inferential transitions involving that expression.1 Such a theory of meaning is holistic, since according to it the meaning or concept any given expression possesses or expresses depends on the inferential relations it stands in to other expressions.

It is widely recognised that this holism leads to two prima facie problems for IRS. First, since no two speakers share the same beliefs, they will inevitably be disposed to make, or treat as correct, different inferential transitions involving an expression. Hence, according to IRS, the same word in different mouths will possess a different meaning and be understood in different ways. It seems to follow that communication is impossible. Second, and relatedly, since a particular speaker’s beliefs [End Page 575] are constantly changing, at different times she will inevitably be disposed to make, or treat as correct, different inferential transitions involving an expression. Hence, according to IRS, the same word in the same mouth will possess a different meaning and be understood differently at different times. It seems to follow that constancy of meaning is impossible. In this paper, I shall focus only on the former problem of communication, although much of what I say will bear on the latter problem of constancy.

Proponents and detractors of IRS alike typically hold that the way to avoid this is to introduce a distinction in kind between those inferential transitions that are determinative of the meaning of an expression and those that are not, i.e. an analytic/synthetic distinction (see Boghossian, 1993; 1994; 1997; Fodor and Lepore, 1991; 1992; Horwich, 1992; 1998; 2005, 38–9; Lepore, 1994; Peacocke, 1992).2 Each party differs only on the issue of whether such a distinction can or should be drawn.

In contrast, Brandom seeks to resolve the communication problem facing IRS without drawing an analytic/synthetic distinction. In his own words, Brandom refuses to adopt such an ‘inegalitarian attitude toward the different inferences a concept is involved in’ (MIE, 634; cf. 484, 587). His egalitarian and novel alternative, which I shall examine in this paper, is to appeal to the nature of de re ascriptions.3

In what follows, I shall take for granted, with Brandom and those authors referenced above, that the communication problem poses a genuine difficulty for IRS and so calls for some kind of response (cp. Block, 1995; Harman, 1993). I shall begin by outlining the details of Brandom’s particular version of IRS and register his recognition of the communication problem (§II). Next, I shall outline the apparatus he introduces [End Page 576] in order to resolve that problem, namely that of de re ascription (§III). Having done so, I shall argue that Brandom’s alternative to the traditional appeal to analyticity fails in several respects to provide a genuine explanation of shareable meaning and mutual understanding (§IV).

In a number of places, Brandom suggests that the mechanism of de re ascription introduces an externalism, according to which the meaning of an expression or the concept it expresses is determined by the linguistic practitioners’ physical environment. This, I shall claim, is either in tension with IRS or fails to provide a genuine account of shared meaning (§V).

One might think that informing my objections to Brandom’s appeal to de re ascription is a suspect and demanding view of communication, one that can and should be challenged. After sketching that view on behalf of my opponent, I shall show that, irrespective of whether it is indeed suspect, the criticisms can be motivated independently of it (§VI). Specifically, they apply equally by the standards of Brandom’s favoured model of communication.

In closing, I recommend that one sympathetic to IRS — and in particular to the version that Brandom develops — accept the traditional response to the communication problem, namely that of drawing a distinction in kind between those inferential transitions that are determinative of meaning and those that are not (§VII). Since at least Quine’s ‘Two...

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