Rhetoric Is a Counterpart of Dialectic (E retorike estin antistrophos te "dialektike"

Greek philosophers who preceded Aristotle, especially Gorgias, Plato, and Isocrates, developed their respective views on persuasive discourse (or rhetoric) based upon their larger philosophical projects. Similarly, I will argue in this essay, Aristotle developed his understanding of rhetoric as a part of his larger philosophical project. He not only equates rhetoric, in many respects, to dialectic, but also treats it separately in the Rhetoric, perhaps as thoroughly as he treats dialectic in the Topics. In addition to these two works, Aristotle addresses rhetorical issues in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, the Sophistical Refutation, the Politics, and the Nichomachean Ethics, perhaps in a similar manner as he addresses dialectic in the Prior Analytics (24a22-25, 68b8-14, 46a3-10), the Sophistical Refutation (165b1-4), the Posterior Analytics (81b18-23), and the Metaphysics (995b21-25). Moreover, the parts that comprise both rhetoric and dialectic—syllogism/enthymeme; induction/example; the respective audiences; and the purposes: to inquire, to argue, to persuade—all receive considerable discussion throughout his logical and nonlogical works. The similarities of the ways in which Aristotle discusses both rhetoric and dialectic and his repeated claims that rhetoric is a "counterpart to" or "outgrowth of" dialectic suggest that, for Aristotle, rhetoric is very closely related to dialectic, that his understanding that rhetoric may be just as much a part of his larger project as is his dialectic—understood within the purposes and intended audiences of each—and further suggest that in order to understand his view of rhetoric, it is first necessary to understand his view of dialectic.¹

I will attempt in this essay to develop an understanding of Aristotle's rhetoric in relation to his dialectic. I will then attempt to situate both into their respective places within Aristotle's expressed purposes for different forms of discourse, and in respect to appropriate discourses for appropriate audiences. Other writers have certainly related aspects of Aristotle's rhetoric (and Rhetoric) to aspects of his philosophy,² and this discussion will draw upon some of these writers' works, but what seems to be lacking is a relatively short discussion that presents a somewhat specific overview of Aristotle's demonstration, dialectic, and rhetoric in a way that clearly illustrates his Rhetoric's relationship to his logical works, and that also delineates and intentionally draws attention to Aristotle's understanding of the intended audiences for each of his discourses. This essay is such an attempt.

After initially setting the stage for the discussion of Aristotle's view of rhetoric in respect to his views of demonstration and dialectic (those other forms of discourse that he carefully developed for expressing his understanding of reality) by briefly discussing how Gorgias's, Plato's, and Isocrates' views of persuasive discourse are inherently related to their larger understandings of what is, I will present Aristotle's views on demonstration and dialectic and their respective parts. I will then discuss the relationship between Aristotle's dialectic and his rhetoric. My discussion will include a look at the term , an analysis of the similarities and differences between dialectic and rhetoric, and a consideration of how Aristotle's enthymeme fits into his rhetorical scheme; in this consideration, I will engage others who, I will argue, have given some but not enough consideration or no consideration at all to the intended audience of the rhetorical discourse in developing their understanding of the enthymeme. After these aspects have been considered, I will summarize the discussion up to that point and then offer a conclusion in which I will assert that Aristotle intended his Rhetoric to be an important discussion that attempts to contribute to the relatively new discipline of rhetoric a theory of persuasion that is derived, in part, from his theory of proofs; that he understands rhetoric to be an important part of his understanding of discourse, perhaps as important a part as his dialectic, each understood within their intended purposes and intended participants and/or audiences; and that his rhetorical "theory" must be understood, as he seems to suggest, in respect to his concept of dialectic.

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