The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe (review)

Early in this thoughtful and evidence-rich volume, the editors consider and put aside the temptation to reify the strategic triangle in question as a variable with independent or mediating causal effects in the foreign relations of its three constituent members. The triangle is not an institution, for it lacks rules and norms to shape expectations and define roles. Nor is it a pluralistic security community, inasmuch as it lacks shared norms or conceptions of security. The triangle is an analytical construct created by and rooted in the objectives, concepts, perceptions, and policies of the three countries (pp. 7–8); it is something more than the diplomatic interactions of three important states, yet something less than the formal institutions familiar in studies of transatlantic relations—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

What makes the strategic triangle interesting and worthy of closer examination, the editors make clear, are two of its important dimensions that shaped Cold War history. First, the objectives and perceptions of France, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and the United States were remarkably consistent for more than 30 years (the period 1965–1995, covered by the volume). Second, the policies of each member of the triangle were constrained and shaped by the nature of the relationship between the two other members. French objectives and perceptions focused on Franco-German cooperation and leadership to make Europe strong in order to balance the United States and enhance French autonomy on the global stage. The FRG sought European unity and capacity through partnership with France so that Europe would be a reliable partner for the United States in a venue that safeguarded Germany’s security and interests in a multilateral context without threatening its neighbors. The United States sought a stronger and thus more unified Europe, but a Europe that would reliably follow American leadership in containing the primary Soviet threat without challenging American global primacy.

These are commonly understood parameters of transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The contribution made by the authors of this volume is their effort to highlight the degree of constraint on interactions among the important players that arose from their three-sided mix of competing and overlapping objectives and perceptions. They convincingly show that the history of the Cold War cannot be understood without an appreciation of how the resultant compromises bent and stressed the triangle—but never tore it apart. Through sets of parallel case studies of key crises or tuning points in Cold War history (the debate on the political institutionalization of Europe in 1958–1963, the NATO crisis of 1966–1967, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the emergence and impact of Ostpolitik and détente, the breakdown of détente and transatlantic tensions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and NATO’s post–Cold War evolution) with separate chapters addressing each case from the American, French, and German perspectives, the authors provide not only a rich and focused diplomatic history, but also a basis for evaluating comparative causal assessments of transatlantic relations and the Cold War. Despite dramatic changes—French withdrawal from NATO’s military structures, the U.S. abandonment of the Bretton Woods system, West Germany’s quiet yet potent initiative in Ostpolitik—what is most striking is how even the United States and France, both of which wanted to limit the constraints on their autonomy and assertions of power, ultimately sought compromise in reaching agreements that resolved each of the transatlantic crises. The editors note that the United States generally was the least affected throughout this history by the strategic triangle, but even U.S. presidents felt compelled to seek acceptable modes for pursuing U.S. objectives in the face of the consistent importance of France and Germany to one another and their ability to work on European alternatives when the Americans were stretching too far...