The Truth Is Our Weapon: The Rhetorical Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles (review)

Chris Tudda is a welcome addition to the ranks of historians of foreign policy who take public rhetoric seriously. He argues that Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, throughout their eight years in office, used belligerent rhetoric that was at odds with their privately held, more conciliatory Cold War aims. The result was a contradictory foreign policy that hindered the Eisenhower administration from achieving its aims. Although Eisenhower and Dulles wanted to move the world toward the safety of peaceful coexistence, their “reliance upon rhetorical diplomacy actually increased the chance of an outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and the United States” (p. 79).

Tudda is surely right that Eisenhower and his administration pursued their aims in contradictory ways. He documents this with three detailed, well-researched case studies: the drive for a European Defense Community, the rhetorical encouragement of the “rollback” of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, and the struggle over Berlin and German reunification. For each case, Tudda gives numerous examples of the bellicose rhetoric used by the president and his secretary of state. But Tudda gives us a rhetorical Eisenhower rather different from the familiar one. He omits the presidential rhetoric that most historians have focused on: the endless assertions of America’s desire for peace and an easing of Cold War tensions. The treatment therefore seems a bit unbalanced.

The same problem arises with Tudda’s assessment of the private intentions of Eisenhower and Dulles. The Eisenhower administration was among those that left behind copious documentation of private conversations. Indeed, so many documents are available that historians can find almost any pattern they want. Tudda generally finds a private intention of easing Cold War tensions and pursuing peaceful coexistence. To make his case, he overlooks the copious documentary evidence indicating that the belligerent public rhetoric quite accurately reflected the speakers’ private views, which were all rooted in a hardline ideological anti-Communism. Peaceful coexistence was more a tactical move than the guiding ideal that Tudda makes it out to be.

Tudda’s thesis will probably be persuasive to readers who are already inclined to see the evidence as he does. His presentation of the evidence is not compelling enough to persuade others who see it differently. However, he does make a powerful case that the Eisenhower administration was frequently (perhaps constantly) contradicting itself, in terms of both means and ends. He also reminds us, quite helpfully, that public rhetoric is not mere window dressing. It does make a difference. The interaction between rhetoric and policy, and between public and private language, deserves ongoing scholarly study.