Abstract

This essay considers four critical areas of German-American defense cooperation during the Cold War: personal and material American aid for West German rearmament and its impact on the character of the German army, reorganization of German and American combat divisions in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the ultimately failed joint venture in tank design in the 1960s and the lack of cooperation in developing infantry fighting vehicles, and the impact of German tactical and operational concepts on post-Vietnam War U.S. Army doctrine. The essay will argue that in critical aspects, U.S. Army leaders adopted German modes of operation.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1543-7795
Print ISSN
0899-3718
Pages
pp. 477-508
Launched on MUSE
2008-04-04
Open Access
No
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