Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953–1961, and: Chruschtschows Berlin-Krise 1958 bis 1963: Drohpolitik und Mauerbau (review)

Winston Churchill's "iron curtain," although conforming to the political reality of the deepening division of Europe in the latter half of the 1940s, was merely a figure of speech. But on 13 August 1961, that division was literally cast in stone, taking a "concrete" shape with the building of the Berlin wall. Conversely, the dismantling of that Cold War artifact by enthusiastic Germans on 9 November 1989 heralded the end of the division of Berlin, Germany, and ultimately Europe. Thus, for anyone interested in the history of Europe and the Cold War, the origins, course, and consequences of the building of the wall should be central foci of interest. The books by Hope Harrison and Gerhard Wettig help satisfy such interest.

Both authors draw on their many years of painstaking research in Soviet and East German archives. Those familiar with the work of Harrison and Wettig will recognize that much of what they have to say in these books had been published earlier in various outlets, including the Journal of Cold War Studies, and presented at numerous conferences. The great benefit of the two books is that they integrate and consolidate the various pieces of research, build on the work of other scholars, assemble and add all relevant archival evidence on the subject, and take into account any criticism of their preliminary findings. What, then, emerges from the two endeavors?

First, on the basic problem and its temporary solution, nothing substantially new. In 1958, riding on a wave of increased self-confidence about perceived changes in the "correlation of forces" in favor of socialism, Nikita Khrushchev launched a campaign to convert West Berlin into an "independent political entity," a "free" and "demilitarized" city. He also threatened to conclude a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (GDR). By 1961, however, Soviet perceptions of a favorable shift in the balance of power had evaporated, and Khrushchev saw himself faced with a serious crisis in the GDR that disrupted the functioning of the Soviet imperial system in Central and Eastern Europe and ultimately put at risk the very existence of the Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Thus, rather than being able, or believing himself able, to act from a position of strength, Khrushchev was forced to take emergency measures. Accordingly, the Soviet Union shifted from an offensive posture aimed at gaining control of the access routes to West Berlin and of the city itself to a defensive posture intended to shore up the East German Communist regime. This transformation has been documented before, including by this reviewer in Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1982) and Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998).

Second, the books offer a comprehensive picture of the increasing pressure on Khrushchev to act. Such pressure emanated in part from the objective state of affairs; that is, the dramatic exodus of the best and the brightest of the East German population through the West Berlin "loophole." It also came from Walter Ulbricht, the East German party leader, who warned that what was at stake was not an isolated implosion of the GDR but an upheaval that would be a disaster for the whole Soviet bloc. Furthermore, in 1961, before and after the construction of the wall, Ulbricht insisted that closing the sectoral borders in Berlin was not enough, and he urged Khrushchev to embrace the goals of the 1958 "ultimatum" regarding a comprehensive solution to the German problem, including the conclusion of a separate peace treaty and transfer of unfettered sovereignty to the GDR.

Third, Harrison and Wettig amply document Khrushchev's indecision, hesitation, and procrastination stemming from his awareness of the risks involved and his uncertainty about...