The Jet Race and the Second World War (review)

One of the fascinating "what might have beens" of World War II is the German development of jet and rocket aircraft and their use in the conflict. The Jet Race and the Second World War describes the simultaneous development of the jet engine in Britain and Germany and how the Germans won the race to first fly and first employ jet and rocket aircraft in combat. Author S. Michael Pavelec goes on to discuss the jet's employment and the tardy Anglo-American response. He states that the Germans achieved success, a judgment based on German firsts, not the impact of these aircraft on the war. The author notes that few of the 1,600 jet and rocket aircraft saw combat and that two thirds of the Me 262s were lost in accidents. (The latter says much about the state of jet technology, German training, and the competence of German airforce (GAF) pilots at this point in the war.) Using secondary sources, he writes that the GAF claimed 446 Allied aircraft destroyed at the cost of 190 Me 262s. As might be expected, this figure is in sharp contrast to the claims of the U.S. Eighth Air Force, the principal opponent of the jets, that its aircraft destroyed 205 jet and rocket fighters for the loss of 69 bombers and fighters. (This again raises the seemingly irresolvable issue of conflicting aerial claims.) Regardless, the newest technology did not win the air war, instead victory was won by overwhelming numbers and (on average) better trained fighter pilots.

Pavelec argues that the lack of key raw materials doomed the GAF jet and rocket aircraft. There are other explanations for the program's failure, the most convincing of which is its immature technology. Rocket engines lacked endurance and were dangerous to both air and ground crews while the early jets suffered from slow acceleration and poor reliability. Regardless, considering German problems and Allied advantages, it is far fetched to believe that jets alone could have provided a "silver bullet" for Germany to avoid defeat. (Even if the Allied air offensive was neutralized, it would not have stopped the ground offensives from crushing Germany in the last year of the war.) Like the V-weapons, jets were spectacular, futuristic, but of no consequence in the war. As Bomber Harris noted, "it is just as essential not to use the unready weapons of the next war as it is not to use the outclassed weapons of the last" (Bomber Offensive, 32). GAF jets did not come too late, they came too early.

Unfortunately, The Jet Race shares many of the typical problems of dissertations transformed into books. Pavelec was not well served by the system (his dissertation advisors, reviewers, and editors) who failed to smooth out these difficulties. This book is too detailed for all but those interested in engine engineering. The context provided goes beyond the focus of this study, diffuses the book, and allows errors and questionable assertions that are outside the topic to unnecessarily intrude on it. While the prose is adequate, there are numerous redundant passages. And despite the considerable depth and breadth of sources, the author inexplicitly failed to employ the USAF Historical Research Agency. This may explain why America's first combat jet, the Lockheed P-80, does not receive its due and the treatment of combat employment is sparse. (Lockheed files are unavailable to the public.) At points there appears to be an over reliance on secondary sources.

The Jet Race is a solid study of jet engines, detailed and well documented. While a contribution as such, it fails to extend effectively beyond this narrow topic. It is also a case study in how not to turn a dissertation into a book. For Pavelec was unable to overcome the limitations of that genre, to place his subject into a larger, more significant context, and reach an audience...