Abstract

Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes' independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument for substance dualism from an important objection.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 69-89
Launched on MUSE
2008-01-16
Open Access
No
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