Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics. An Introduction to His Thought (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 293 graphies, which put the individual thinkers and their works into their proper doctrinal context, are very welcome. Noack tries to be, and is, fair. We saw that he even tries to find a common ground between phenomenological and analytical philosophy. He does not reject the latter at the outset. He is objective within the limits of his philosophical upbringing and his historical background. MAx RIESZR New YorIc City Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics. An Introduction to His Thought. By George Joseph Seidel, O. S. B. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964. Pp. x + 169.) Seidel's book, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Soeratics, is a carefully documented explication of Heidegger's interpretations of Parnmnides and Heraclitus. Beyond this it attempts and in large measure succeeds in giving an account of tteidegger's understanding of the western philosophical tradition as originated and at the same time fatefully misled by the Greeks. Seidel intends his study to be an introduction to Heidegger's thought. For purposes of evaluation I will divide my remarks into three major categories: (1) Seidel's work as an introduction to Heidegger's philosophy, (2) Seidel's work as an account of Heidegger's philosophy , and (3) the value of the work to the historian of philosophy and to the philosopher. Seidel's rejections of various al~rnative approaches to Heidegger's thought are somewhat contrived and not terribly convincing, which brings into question the author's claim tt~at Heidegger is approached least prejudicially through his interpretations of the presocratics . There are I think even more compelling reasons for rejecting Seidel's claim. In fact, there are strong reasons for rejecting his approach. I shall deal with them shortly. The author rejects an approach to Heidegger through Heidegger's Kantbuch (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysilc) because of the difficulty involved in disentangling Kant's views, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's views, and Heidegger's own views as revealed in these interpretations. The same difficulty, however, pertains with respect to YIeidegger's interpretations of Parmenides and Heraclitus, though I suspect classical scholars will react with no small degree of indignation to the suggestion that Heidegger's interpretations of these thinkers are not easily distinguishable from what they actually said. To give but one more example, Seidel rejects an approach to tIeidegger through Hegel on the grounds that the similarities holding between the two thinkers tends to blind one to their essential differences. Now if this were truly the case, and I seriously doubt that it is, it is a very sad commentary on the capacities of historians and scholars of German philosophy. Leaving aside the fact that the reasons offered for the purpose of eliminating various alternative approaches to tteidegger are dubious, let us consider Seidel's own approach. There are at least two strong reasons for rejecting it. To begin with, it is indispensable to an understanding of Heidegger's "conversations" with past thinkers that his views on the nature of the history of philosophy be grasped. This in turn involves a commentator in that nest. of problems which center in and around I]eidegger's understanding of the nature of history. This leads one back ultimately to a discussion of Heidegger's conception of time and of temporality , for it is temporality that grounds and makes intelligible historicity and with it those sets of happenings which come to be understood as historical. Heidegger makes clear in Sein und Zeit that a proper understanding of time is necessary not only for the articulation of Being, but that it is the indespensable horizon in terms of which a phenomenological destruction--and, one might add, understanding--of the history of ontology is possible. Now Seidel is by no means unaware of this, but nonetheless he fails to give us any more than a sketchy account of Heidegger's understanding of time and temporality, and he gives us little more information with respect to history and historicity. The information he does give--at least in the case of history--is accurate enough, but it lacks that amplification and care for detail that would permit us a comprehension of the nature and significance of Heidegger...