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Kant's Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779): Part I GIORGIO TONELLI THE IMPORTANCEOF THE THEORY OF GENIUS in Kant's philosophy was realized comparatively early in the history of Kant]orschung, and several works have been devoted to this subject? But nobody has, until now, tried to reconstruct the development of Kant's ideas on genius utilizing the materials contained in his Nachlass, published by Adickes.2 This is what I shall attempt in the present paper, limiting the study to the period from 1770 to 1779, coinciding with Kant's preliminary works for the elaboration of the Critique o] Pure Reason. First I shall try to establish Kant's opinions on genius in the aforesaid span of time, second, to trace the sources of such opinions in Kant's cultural background. w Before 1770 Kant rarely uses the term genius. The corresponding notion has not yet a clearly defined place in his theories about "empirical psychology" (or "anthropology") and "aesthetics." In 1764 he writes about "the Italian genius" as compared with the spiritual endowment of other nations (II, 244). "Genius" here generally corresponds to the English and French notion "g~nie du peuple." s The word "genius" appears in the same year in some other contexts, with the generical meaning of a "power of the mind." * In 1768 Kant uses, in a letter to Herder, the word "genius," apparently identified with the expression "fertile spirit." ~ Kant actually is warning Herder 1See especially: K. Hoffman, Die Umbildung der Kantischen Lehre vom Genie in Schellings System des transscendentalen Idealismus (Bern: 1907, Berner Studien zur Philos. u. ihrer Geschiehte, LIII); R. Schlapp, Kants Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung der "Kritik der Urteilskraft" (G6ttingen: 1901); O. SchSnd6rffer, "Kant's Definition vom Genie," Altpreussische Monatsschrift, 1893, xxx; O. Wichmann, "Kant's Begriff vom Genie und seine Bedeutung~" Deutsche Akademische Rundschau, Jhg. II, 12 Sem., Folge N. 2; 7, 15 Jan. 1925. Schlapp's work, utilizing Kant's Kolleghefte (or notes taken from his lectures), is peculiarly important. In Kants Gesammelte Schriften, published by the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften. This is the edition we refer to in our quotations. We give only the number of the volume and the page for the printed works of Kant, and the number of the volume and that of the Reflexion for the Nachlass. We refer to the last issue of the Preussische Akademie Ausgabe edition. We intend to utilize Kant's Nachlass following the same criteria as in: G. Tonelli, Kant, dall'estetica metafisica all'estetica psicoempirica. Studi sulla genesi del criticismo (1754-1771) e sulle sue fonti (Torino: 1955),Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Serie 35 Tomo 3, Parte III. See pp. 7-10, 192,253-255. 3See Tonelli, op. cir., p. 115. 4"Der h6chste Schwung, den das menschliche Genie nahm, um zu dem Erhabenen aufzusteigen , bestand in Abenteuern" (II, 255). 5We shall translate with "spirit" the peculiar sense of the German Geist as Kant (as we shall see later) employs it here. Otherwise Geist may mean in German (among other things) : 9 , ,, , ,, ,, ,* soul (= Seele) both as man s soul ~nd as spiritual creature, ghost (= Gespenst), chemical spirit", "wit" (= Witz), or "anthropological characteristic of a time or of a nation," this last [io9] 110 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY against a youthful, mystical exaggeration of this genial fertility, to whose motion the calmness of the philosopher's contemplative life is to be preferred. Criticism6makes genius more cautious. 7 Most probably from this period, come two Reflections s bearing on our subject . Genius is referred to art (Kunst) and literature (sch6ne Wissenscha]ten), and opposed to learning (Erlernung) and imitation (Nachahmung) in literature . Genius is related to the judging intellect (Verstand zu urtheilen), especially as intellect is common sense (gesunder Verstand), but not vulgar common sense (gemeiner Verstand) to which spirit (called here esprit) is opposed. Common sense does not apply to genius only, but also to the imitative process ; not only to literature, but to every kind of science. In this early stage of his psychological ideas, Kant seems to apply the concept of genius to aesthetic activities only. Common sense is clearly not the same as genius, but rather a power ruling it...

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