Hume's Analogies in Treatise I and the Commentators

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 155 HUME'S ANALOGIES IN Treatise I AND THE COMMENTATORS There is very little in Hume's theory of disposition about which his commentators are agreed. The most reasonable explanation for this stems from the fact that Hume illustrates his arguments with four analogies, each of which illuminates different points within his analysis of dispositions, and it is far from clear as to which point Hume has in mind at each step of the argument. He thinks that "perhaps these four reflections may help to remove all difficulties to the hypothesis I have propos'd concerning abstract ideas, so contrary to that, which has hitherto prevailed in philosophy." 1 But to which of Hume's hypotheses are these reflections relevant? Consider the first of these analogies: "When we mention any great number such as a thousand, the mind has generally no adequate idea of it, but only a power of producing such an idea, by its adequate idea of the decimals, under which the number is comprehended. This imperfection, however in our ideas, is never felt in our reasonings; which seems to be an instance parallel to the present one of universal ideas." ~ If we assume that Hume intends to strengthen his reader's grasp of his central principle that general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a general word which gives them a more extensive signification , then the first analogy is anything but helpful. Kemp-Smith takes the view that the analogy is of no use since Hume "assumes as granted precisely what most stands in need of explanation." ~ According to Kemp-Smith, Hume lightly passes over the vital issue which, to his mind, is the justification for the view that an image may function in a representative capacity. Kemp-Smith's interpretation of the passage fastens on Hume's expression "adequate idea" which is defined elsewhere in the Treatise as "image." 4 Thus, when Hume, in the first analogy, denies that the mind may have an "adequate idea" (i.e., image) of decimals but affirms that the mind has the power to produce that idea, KempSmith replies that if this is the case then the idea is either not an image or it is not adequate. It is a bit curious that when Kemp-Smith quotes the first analogy from the text of the Treatise, he omits the last sentence, an omission which may in part explain why he did not interpret the passage differently. The sentence in question reads: "This imperfection, however in our ideas, is never felt in our reasonings; which seems to be an instance parallel to the present one of universal ideas." 5 This passage suggests a view of the analogy contrary to Kemp-Smith's. Hume is saying that despite the imprecise character of our ideas of extraordinarily large numbers we are, nonetheless, capable of thinking and reasoning about them. We know, for example, how to perform elaborate arithmetic operations and to reach precise conclusions with respect to such sums, despite the absence of equally 1Citations to David Hume are from A Treatise o] Human Nalure, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: 1951)p. 24. Ibid. pp. 22-23. aNormanKemp-Smith,The Philosophy o] David Hume (London: 1949)p. 263. Hume,op. c~t., p. 27. uIbid., p. 23. 156 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY precise imagery. Analogously, though general ideas are often imprecise and imperfect , relatively intricate and precise distinctions with respect to these ideas are possible. Kemp-Smith finds this and the subsequent analogies inadequate because he does not treat them as analogies, but rather as examples of points in the preceding analysis which Hume does not make clear. Indeed, Constance Maund, whose interpretation of this passage is one with Kemp-Smith's, says that Hume's "analogies" are not strictly speaking analogies at all, "but merely instances or illustrations of the point he is trying to make." 6 In the second analogy, Hume says that we have several instances of habits, which may be "reviv'd by one single word; as when a person, who has by rote any periods of a discourse, or any number of verses, will be put in remembrance of the whole, which...