The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law (review)

260 HISTOI~Y OF PHILOSOPHY 2030. For "1940" sc. "1942" 3104c. For "Brunschwig" se. "Brunschwicg" 3211. For "1252" sc. "1952" 3304. For "Smart, H. J. C." sc. "Smart, J. J. C." In the Analytical Index: Yugoslavia. For "3463" sc. "3461, 3462" Bryn Mawr College JEAN A. POTTER The Politics o! Discretion: Pu]endor] and the Acceptance o] Natural Law. By Leonard Krieger. (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. 311 + xii. f~6.50.) It is a shame that the name of Samuel Pufendorf needs to be introduced to many scholars today, but such is the case. The impact of his thought upon the intellectual history of Europe extended for well over a century. Many of the great lights of the eighteenth century, as diverse a collection as Thomasius, Blackstone, Rousseau, and Peter the Great openly acknowledged their debts to him. As Krieger notes, Pufendorf "inaugurated the predominant school of eighteenth~century jurisprudence" (p. 257). His natural law theory, while not seminal or highly original, was widely read and absorbed by his contempories and those who followed them. And yet, Pufendoff is hardly known in this country, and full-length studies of his thought are rare indeed. Professor Krieger opens the introduction to this work by summarizing briefly Pufendorf's life work and then comments himself that "none of these intellectual accomplishments is particularly remarkable" (p. 1). What is siguificant to Krieger is precisely this lack of major importance that he finds--he speaks of "an ultimate impact that was minimal" (p. 2). Pufendorf is presented here as an intellectual governess who had no part in the bringing into the world of seventeenth-century natural law theory, but who formed and developed it until it "became acceptable and respectable" (p. 3). The point of this work is that Samuel Pufendoff serves as a model for the study of intellectual compromise. Consequently, this book can be read on two levels--as a study of Pufendorf's thought and as a model for viewing the nature of compromise in political philosophy. On both counts, Professor Krieger gives an able and insightful interpretation, made all the more striking by the fact that little of the first seems to have been sacrificed in demonstrating the validity of the second. One can cavil, as this reviewer does, that there is much hyperbole in the introductory remarks cited above. In contrast, in his Epilogue, Krieger recites Pufendorf's achievements again, and in detail they appear as solidly distinguished as they really are. For many of the thinkers of the eighteenth century, the twin names of Grotius and Pufeudorf are linked inseparably with natural law theory. And in the six chapters that march from Introduction to Epilogue, Krieger presents the figure of Pufendorf as a powerful, if somewhat eclectic, influence upon his and succeeding generations. The subjects of these chapters alone show the range of the man's contributions in philosophy, ethics, political theory, jurisprudence, history, and theology. The shape of these interests, nonetheless, was given by a mind to which the compromise of ideas and commitments was a felt necessity--not only a pragmatic decision but also part of the very stuff of which Pufendorf's intellectual life was formed. What is seen in observing the shrewd pattern of career development by which Pufendorf sought out patrons who suited his unorthodox idea.% is the degree to which he adapted his own opinions to current circumstances. As a mediator who served to translate concepts into terms of broad acceptability, Pufendorf did not so much sacrifice his major concerns as he moved from one position to another, as he bent his principles under the weight of new experience . He admitted with compelling candor that he pruned his ideas to suit the situations in which he found himself. This not only kept him from writing on some points, but also controlled what he did write. Money and patronage became for Pufendorf not merely a means of support but part of the very condition of intellectual progress. He came, therefore, to stress the necessity of use]ul knowledge (the emphasis is Kricger's), and while he remained BOOK REVIEWS 261 committed to the application of the new science to law...