Philosophy, Science and Sense Perception (review)

354 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY presents any case for which his strikingly novel and interesting view proves satisfactory. The problem is too involved to be discussed here ; I can only state briefly that Kuhn's view is a ,solution to the problem of criterion of novelty of facts, that no previous solution to this problem fits Duhem's theory of continuity, and that Duhem himself has entireIy ignored this problem. Kuhn is braver and more consistent than Duhem. This point alone, I think, makes the present work significant to students of scientific method who take Duhem seriously--others do not really count. I hope that Kuhn will consider his own work no more final than the standard textbook of science, and I look forward to more interesting surprises from his elegant pen. JOSEPH AOASSI Boston University Philosophy, Science and Sense Perception. By Maurice Mandelbaum. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964.Pp. 262. $6.50.) The central topic of this book, which consists of four long essays, is critical or indirect realism. In the first two studies, Locke Boyle, and Newton are interpreted as early proponents of it. Each of the remaining pair is a polemic against a major rival doctrine. The elements of critical realism may be stated as follows: (1) Sensory data support belief in the existence of enduring and independent physical objects. (2) Ordinary persons uncritically assume physical things are the objects presented in sensory awareness. (3) Science's psycho-physical theory of perception, which succeeds in causally explaining incongruous sensory objects, i.e., those calling for locutions like "This oar appears bent, but is really straight," requires a sharp distinction between sensory objects and physical causes (physical objects). (4) Science's theoretical portrayal of physical objects as 'consisting of' atomic or sub-atomic particles must be incorporated straightforwardly and literally into ontology or the philosophical analysis of what there is. (5) Similarly, the causal theory of perception must be the basic epistemological model, i.e., the sensory object-physical cause dichotomy is fundamental. Obviously, a basic methodological principle of critical realism is that science is not just a device for making accurate predictions; by explaining connections and distinctions within experience it establishes the existence of (theoretically described) objects which are not themselves experienced. Among others, the following two questions must be answered by critical realists: (a) What justifies inferences from sensory objects to things which in principle are imperceptible? (b) What connections are there between physical causes, sensory objects, and ordinary perceptual judgments ? In "Newton and Boyle and the Problem of 'Transdiction'," Mandelbaum claims the two eminent scientists as implicit critical realists and examines what he considers to be their attempts to answer the first question. In "Locke's Realism," he argues that Locke accepted atomism and the causal theory of perception and tried to provide a theory of knowledge wherein the second question would receive a satisfactory answer. Many, of course, have held that the two questions are unanswerable on the critical realist's assumptions; they have insisted that the sensory objectphysical cause dichotomy produces skepticism and a hopelessly confused account of knowledge. Some have asserted our total ignorance of physical things; others have attempted to avoid this by showing that physical things are presented in sense experience. In "Of Scepticism with regard to the Senses," Mandelbaum attacks Hume's defense of the former view. In "Toward a Critical Realism," he maintains the untenability of Moore's and Ryle's versions of the latter. Despite some serious weaknesses, Philosophy, Science and Sense Perception is a worthwhile contribution to both epistemology and the history of philosophy. For example, Mandelbaum describes numerous cases of both normal and incongruous perception and insists, quite correctly, that philosophers discuss the types of entities they involve as well as the language used to speak about them. His detailed treatment of certain key sections of Locke's Essay is also extremely helpful, because it provides enlightenment on two notoriously obscure topics, first, our ideas of substance and, second, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Regarding the former, he not only shows how Locke's commitment to atomism shaped the discussion of ideas of substances and the nominal-real essence distinction, he also indicates wily...