In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

BOOK REVIEWS 227 To summarize: Reseller's book is a good introduction to the theory of distributive justice, as well as a helpful critique of doctrinaire utilitarianism. Arguments are clearly and concisely stated, and Rescher's own "deontological" or "chastened utilitarianism" is sharply outlined. In addition, the text is amply supported with graphic illustrations of alternative distribution patterns which are of particular aid to the reader, and the book as a whole is divided into well-articulated, bitesize sections (none exceeds five pages). Whether we agree or disagree with Rescher's views, we could hardly want a more valuable statement of the problem as a beginning and locus for further discussion. The thirty-one-page bibliography is a fine contribution in its own right. It includes, in chronological order under topical headings, over 350 books, articles, and sections from books which are meant to stand as a comprehensive listing (to 1965) of twentieth-century philosophical treatments of utilitarianism and the ethical problems of distributive justice. Some representative titles from the social sciences and the history of philosophical discussion in this area prior to the present century are also mentioned. Cn~LV.S A. Con Southern Illinois University Morality and Utility. By Jan Narveson. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. ix + 302. $7.50) This work seems to me to be definitive---the last word, I trust, on this subject. It is a sustained, clear argument given to us in an irenical spirit, and I, for one, would be glad to let the matter rest without further debate and without a detailed examination or review. As the jacket design suggests, the historical significance of this argument is the thesis that if J. S. Mill had been equipped with Immanuel Kant at the base of his brain, serving as a kind of pineal gland, morality and utility could rest in peace on sound principles. They could have agreed that prudence should be universal and that happiness should be distributed generally (equally, so far as equitably leasable) among all men. Jan Narveson and I have had the comforting experience, to which he refers in the "Preface": "it was both encouraging and chastening to discover to what extent my views have been anticipated or independently arrived at by others." It is now over twenty years since Henry Aiken and I agreed to close the diseussion of this subject, imagining that we jointly possessed the joint blessing of Ralph Barton Perry and John Dewey. I have found it prudent to keep conscientiously silent on the subject after my youthful sallies into it. But I cannot pass this book by in silence without giving it a public blessing. Narveson, after a careful, long analysis, tells us in a footnote that: Gauthier, Sparshott, Baier, Nowell-Smith, and Castafieda . . . and probably Toulmin, Hare, and Stevenson, among others, all of them imply that if one wants something, [and if] getting it will not interfere with the satisfactions of others, and it isn't contrary to any other important wants of one's own, then it would make no real sense to deny that I am justified in trying to get it. (265n) And he adds that: Plato, Aristotle, all of the Stoics and Epicureans in one way or another, and probably most of the medievals, would accept this.... Kant, incidentally, implies this in his famous view that hypothetical imperatives are "analytic." (265n) 228 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY With such a goodly company of witnesses, we might be content, or we might go on and hope that the heavenly choir of invisible intelligences and the Perfect Judge Himself on that Last Day might lend their Amen. In any case, I accept the whole argument and its foundations as Narveson has formulated them without further ado. But, of course, not without asking a further question, not to the author, but to myself. Where do I go from here? I am daily surrounded by a score of chores and duties that I simply have-to-do, whether they contribute to my happiness and human welfare in general or not. Some are relatively pleasant, others (such as writing reviews) verge on frustration. In the face of such "to-be-dones" I find it both...

pdf

Share