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224 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY At times Williams writes as if Kant is an ethical intuitionist of a more familiar sort. For example, he ascribes to Kant the view that in particular moral situations we "cognize" and "are conscious of" what we ought to do, and he says that practical reason "makes known" to us how we ought to act. Here the implication is not just that we see ourselves as obligated but that we correctly perceive what we ought to do in each situation. Again, on Williams' account, we do not make use of any general criteria for moral action and cannot justify the perceptual claim by appeal to any such criteria. Although this interpretation is more plausible than the last, I do not think that the textual evidence will support it. Kant's attempt to state and defend a rational system of moral principles in his Metaphysics of Morals shows that his model for making moral decisions is not, like Prichard's, the incorrigible perception of particular truths but rather the exercise of judgment in applying certain general moral principles, themselves justifiable in terms of the (admittedly imprecise) notions encapsulated in the various formulations of the Categorical Imperative. One source of Williams' troubles, I suspect, is the presupposition that unless one accepts his intuitionistic interpretation one is forced to say either that the Categorical Imperative was meant to be a "precise logical criterion" for the moral worth (or rightness) of actions or else that it was not meant to be a guide for conduct at all. The second alternative is plainly false, and the first makes Kant's theory appear ridiculous. It is a mistake, however, to think that these are the only options. Often, both in philosophical works and in everyday experience, principles serve as the grounds for judgments and decisions even though they are imprecise, leave much room for doubt in hard eases, and cannot be applied in a mechanical way. This is not to say that they guide us indirectly by giving us tips about how to put ourselves into the proper frame of mind to exercise intuition. Imprecise principles may provide imprecise criteria, and, as Aristotle and Wittgenstein remind us, they need not be disparaged for that. The Categorical Imperative, then, can be viewed as an attempt to state generally the basic grounds for correct moral judgment even though it is obviously not a device for cranking out precise answers to every moral question. Understood in this way, the Categorical Imperative is immune from certain common criticisms but is still open to others. Unfortunatdy, as Williams fails to distinguish this interpretation from what he calls the "traditional" one, he does not discuss these problems. TaOMAS E. HILL, JR. University of California at Los Angeles God en wereld. De vraag naar het transcendentale in Schleiermachers "Dialektik.'" By L. Oranje. (Kampen, Netherlands: J. H. Kok, 1968. Pp. 264) The present study, an Amsterdam Free University dissertation, which appeared in Dutch 1 with an abstract in German, is of special interest insofar as it deals with Of other Dutch studies on Schleiermaeher may be mentioned: .W.I. Aalders, Schleiermachers Reden fiber die Religion als proeve van apologie (Schleiermachefs Reden fiber die Religion as a specimen of apologetics) (Leiden, 1909). G. J. Hoenderdaal, Religieuze existentie en aesthetische aanschouwing. Een studie over bet misverstand omtrent het aesthetisch element in Schleiermachers wezensbepaling der religie (Religious existence and aesthetic contemplation . A study on the misunderstanding concerning the aesthetic element in Schleiermacher 's definition of the essence of religion) (Leiden, 1948). Important for the frame of reference of the present study is O. D. Duintjer, De vraag naar het transcendentale, vooral in verband met Heidegger en Kant (The quest for the transcendental, especially in connexion with Heidegger and Kant) (Leiden, 1966). BOOK REVIEWS 225 F. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) as a philosopher, distinct from the theologian. The subjects of inquiry are the lectures in dialectic, which Schleiermacher gave in different forms in Berlin in the years 1811, 1814, 1818, 1822, 1828, and 1831. Shortly before his death, Schleiermacher wrote an introduction to the publication of his Dialektik, which he wanted to prepare; this publication has been cared for, after his death, by his friend...

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