Chomsky's Variations on a Theme by Descartes

Chomsky's Variations on a Theme by Descartes HARRY M. BRACKEN CaO~SKY'S comatmu'noNs to linguistics, to the psychology of language learning, to the criticism of behaviorism and of bchaviori~ accounts (whether from psychologists or philosophers), to the theory of innate ideas, and to political thought and action are already well known. In Cartesian Linguistics, 1 Chomsky establishes himself as a historian of philosophy. This monograph is, as the subtiflr says, "a chapter in the history of rationalist thought." More.~ver, it is an important chapter ~rioh in its relevant citations from the literature and impressive in its overall theme. Not content with attacking the standard empiricist and behaviorist modds of language acquisition, Chomsky returns to the seventeenth century to explore the model he argues we should have followed. Had we remained true to the Cartesian tradition, not only might we have made forward progress, but we would not have devoted so much energy to the r of theories that are devoid of explanatory power and that miss the point with regard to the nature both of the human mind and of language. Leaving historical questions aside for the moment, it is C"nomsky's contention that only with the inclusion of innate ideas can we ea'ticulatr a theory of language acquisition rich enough to square with the known facts. "The problem," he says elsewhere, "is quite analogous to the problem of studying the innate principles that make .it possible for a bird to acquire the knowledge that expresses itself in nest-building or in song-production." 2 According to Chomsky, there are three "crucial aspects of linguistic competence ." (1) The creative aspect, (2) deep versus surface structure, and (3) universality .3 First, the creative aspect of language use. This is "crucial" because b~haviorist theories derive their air of plausibility by ignoring it. "By this phrase [creative aspect] I refer to the ability to produce and interpret new sentences in independence from 'stimulus control'--i.e., external stimuli or independently Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History o] Rationalist Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1966). Abbreviated in .text as CL. "Recent contributions to the theory of innate ideas," Synth~e, XVII (1967), 2-3. Abbreviated in text as RC. a I do not propose to question either the intelligibility of these three aspects or the appropriateness of Chomsky's application of them to the Cartesians, partly because recent criticisms have not altered my own opinion that Chomsky is ess~ntialIy fight on both counts, and partly because I am interested in another phase of his argument. [;SIJ !82 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY identifiable internal states" (RC 4). This is but one mark of a "species-specific capacity" of man, and one which .is ,both (a) unbounded in scope and (b) stimulusfree . These are independent properties. Thus although we may cite the "unboundedness of human speech, as an expression of limitless thought," we must realize that automata (or Cartesian animals) may produce "unbounded" behavior. Moreover, to get at the "creativeaspect of language use," the lYropertyof being stimulus-free must .be coupled with "appropriateness of behavior to new situations ."As Chomsky interpretsthe Cartesians,itis preciselybecause man responds "appropriately" to new situations and because man's behavior, unlike the automaton's is not controlledby stimuli,thatman is said to possess characteristics which are "beyond .thebounds of mechanical explanation" (CL 77), and accordingly ,which require the postulation of a new (.immaterial)entity. Thus a "fundamental contribution" of the Cartesian tradition,a most exciting one from Chomsky's point of view, isthis"creativeaspect."The Cartesians saw the uniqueness of man's linguisticcapacity and they sought to characterizeit and to elucidate the radicaldifferencebetween human language and the pseudo-language of animals. By virtue of its stimulus-freecharacter, human language is seen as serving "as an instrument of frcc thought and self-expression.The limitlesspossibilitiesof .thought and .imagination are reflectedin the creative aspect of language use" (CL 29). The language provides finite means but infinite possibilities of expression constrained only by rules of concept formation and sentence formation, these being in part particular and idiosyncratic but in part universal, a common human endowment. The finitely specifiable form of each language--in...