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348 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Leibniz' Cosmological Synthesis. By Anna Teresa Tymieniecka. (Assert: Royal Van Gorcum Ltd., 1964. Pp. x+207. No price given) As the author points out, Leibniz scholarship has suffered in recent times because of Leibniz' inherently metaphysical orientation and his generally speculative as opposed to empirical tendencies---attempts at "saving the phenomena" notwithstanding. In her study Tymieniecka attempts to remedy this deficiency. Choosing to forego standard historical explanations of Leibniz" thought, she follows Jalabert in contending that the key to Leibnizian philosophy is to be found in the analysis of the essential nature of individual substances. Tymieniecka seeks to articulate Leibniz' fundamental, underlying framework, which she construes as an implicit metaphysical theory of the creative laws governing the universe caught in the process of creation, which system of laws . . . [she] label[s] the "constitutive scheme of the universe," while its basic point of reference, or its skeleton.... [she] call[s] "the multispherical constitutive pattern of the universe." (p. 5) Clearly Tymieniecka's orientation is highly--and skillfully--metaphysical. She demonstrates considerable competence with respect to the Leibnizian corpus, as well as firm grounding in a broad range of secondary literature, including the works of Russdl, Cassirer and Gu6roult. In this review I shall limit myself to but a few observations and comments. A major foundation and guiding principle for Tymieniecka's study is the conviction that the Leibnizian question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" must be construed in three distinct but complementary ways. The question requires reference to origin, r and modes of operation, if it is to be answered successfully. In this Tymieaiecka is clearly correct, and her pursuit of the answer(s) is disciplined and systematic. The fact that she considers reins indicates her concern to stress the essentially , ff incipiently, evolutionary tendencies in Leibniz' metaphysic. Tymieniecka's analysis of the philosophical meaning of the "Universal Science of Characters" is equally cogenL Leibniz' ideal science of sciences--contrary to some contemporary and contemporizing suggestions--was not limited to a linguistically grounded conceptual analysis having mathematical structure. Rather, as Tymieniecka indicates, Leibniz strove for a philosophical system of the knowable and, thus, a system of things. Conceiving the system as being composed of basic elements, the complete set of these elements' possible interrelations and the rules of their variation, Leibniz' science, thus, would provide a blueprint of the structural mechanisms of the universe. The philosophical calculus which would result would explain via demonstration aU possible developments. The utter and uncompromising philosophical rationalism of Leibniz' position could receive no clearer expression. Tymieniecka writes, Since the laws of the construction of new complexes (like the laws of variation and hypothesis) would be oriented toward explaining the manner of generation, the constitution of things, that is, toward 9 the possible method of the production of things, this system of relations would permit one, at a single glance, to outline the nature, origin and progress of the universe, starting from basic elements and applying the rules of possible variation. Leibniz has such an ideal system in mind.... (p. 36) In her discussion of apperception, the concept of the unconscious, and petites perceptions, Tymieniecka suggests, though does not argue with sufficient rigor, that the distinction between conception and perception in Leibniz is one not iust of degree but of quality or kind. Such an interpretation of Leibniz' philosophical psychology BOOK REVIEWS 349 places it much more in accord with Kant's doctrines. This interpretation, I believe, is highly questionable, but Tymieniecka's presentation, ff incomplete, is nonetheless plausible. Tymieniecka does point out that the notion of perception as well as that of petites perceptions is divorced from the conscious-unconscious distinction. And her critical discussion and appraisal of Oanz' attempt to connect the notion of petites perceptions with the unconscious is admirable. Tymieniecka distinguishes three meanings of the term 'representation' and correlates them with three Leibnizian terms: representation, expression and mirroring. Relying rather heavily on K6hler's historical study as analyzed by Mahnke, she explores these notions with considerable care. The point of her analysis is to tie the Leibnizian concept of representation to Leibniz' cosmology, and this she does well. In general Tymieniecka's study is well conceived...

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