Hobbes on Obligation, Moral and Political: Part One: Moral Obligation

Hobbes on Obligation, Moral and Political Part One: Moral Obligation STANLEY MOORE IN THE DEDICATIONOF De Cive, Hobbes states his central argument in the following words: Having . . . arrived at two maxims of human nature; the one arising from the concupiscible part, which desires to appropriate to itself the use of those things in which all others have a joint interest; the other proceeding from the rational, which teaches every man to fly a contra-natural dissolution, as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature: ... I seem from them to have demonstrated by a most evident connection .., the rudiments both of moral and of Civil prudence. That appendage which is added concerning the regiment of God, hath been done with this intent; that the dictates of God Almighty in the law of nature, might not seem repugnant to the written law, revealed to us in his word. 1 The argument, in both De Cive and Leviathan, proceeds from morals to politics to religion. First, in chapters on the state of nature and the laws of nature, Hobbes presents his demonstration of the rudiments of moral prudence---his account of men's duties as men. Next, in chapters on commonwealths by institution and by acquisition, he presents his demonstration of the rudiments of civil prudence-his account of men's duties as subjects. And finally, in chapters on God's kingdoms by nature and by covenant, he presents his account of men's duties as Christians. The argument of his earlier work, The Elements of Law, parallels the first two parts of this sequence, but interpolates the account of men's duties as Christians within the account of their duties as subjects. 2 What are the connections between these parts? According to Hobbes, his moral theory is independent of the other tow, in the sense that none of its premises are taken from political theory or theology. His political theory he presents as De Cive (English Works, ed. by Molesworth, vol. 2), p. vii. 2 For the three kinds of duties, see De Cive, p. ix. [43] 44 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY developed from his moral theory. And his theology he presents as an appendix-consistent with, but not presupposed by, his moral and political theory. Hobbes's account of these connections can be challenged at two points. What may be called the theological, or appeal to God, criticism argues that his demonstration of the rudiments of morality is invalid without support from theological premises. To accept this criticism is to reject his claim to have developed a moral theory independent of theology. What may be called the deontological, or appeal to duty, criticism argues that his demonstration of the rudiments of morality is invalid without support from ethical premises. To accept this criticism does not entail rejecting his claim to have developed a moral theory independent of theology. But to specify these ethical premises, I shall argue, is to challenge him at another point. His political theory, or account of men's duties as subjects, turns out to be inconsistent with his moral theory, or account of men's duties as men. Both appeal-to-God and appeal-to-duty arguments are set forth in the Hobbes critiques of Taylor and Warrender. (I call these critiques rather than interpretations , because they reject too much of what Hobbes claimed to achieve to pass for reconstructions of what he really meant.) Yet there is a difference of emphasis. Taylor develops the deontological argument first, and then uses Hobbes's account of law as command to link the appeal to duty with the appeal to God. Warrender develops the theological argument first, and then treats appeal to the self-evident and intrinsic authority of natural law as a weaker alternative--sufficient for grounding Hobbes's moral theory but inconsistent with his account of law as command. For disentangling the two lines of criticism, it is sufficient to consider Taylor's version of the appeal to duty and Warrender's version of the appeal to God. The theological argument, as Warrender presents it, amounts to dismissing as obviously invalid the argument Hobbes actually presents and then attempting to construct an acceptable replacement. The crucial claim...