A Note on Gladstone and Berkeley

372 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Owen's own remarks and notes contain in fact evidence to show how easy it was for Aristotle to go from a word to its definition (or explanatory formula) and back: "it makes no difference which one says" (p. 73; cf. note 2). Further evidence is also forthcoming. For instar.ce, from Pr. An. I, 35 it appears that what the syllogistic variables stand for in Aristotle is not always a single word, but might be a longer logos. This seems to be viewed by Aristotle as an unimportant accident of language. There does not seem to be much of a difference between what one can say of a single word and what one can say of a complex phrase in the parts of the Topics we have been considering, either. In l10b16 IT. Aristotle does not say or in any other way emphasize that he is dealing with the equivocity of a phrase as contrasted with that of a single word: he simply mentions a case of non-homonymous multiplicity of uses as an illustration of the topoi he is there discussing. In Top. I, 15, 107b6 ft. a logos is said to be homonymous, not amphibolous, as we might expect. Owen suggests that this is due to the fact that the ambiguity in question turns on that of the single word symmetros. There is not much evidence one way or the other, but even if Owen is right, the passage nevertheless illustrates the fact that the difference between homonymy and amphiboly was not very great for Aristotle. The insignificance of the difference is also indicated by the fact that the word "amphiboly" is often used by Aristotle for purposes other than the marking of the equivocity of a phrase. For instance, in Poetics 25, 1461a26 amphiboly is attributed to a single word. The relative insignificance of the ideas of amphiboly and paronymy in Aristotle's mature writings perhaps also becomes natural in this way. Thus Owen's remarks seem to me to add up to a point different from what he himself primarily emphasizes. What they bring out, it seems to me, is the role of the concept of amphiboly in the formation of Aristotle's idea of a non-homonymous multiplicity of uses. JAAKKO HINTIKKA Academy of Finland A NOTE ON GLADSTONEAND BERKELEY In 1871, Professor A. C. Fraser presented to W. E. Gladstone his just published edition of the works of Berkeley. These volumes along with others from Gladstone's collection are in the library Gladstone founded, St. Deiniol's, Hawarden, Flintshire. Gladstone's notations, marginal comments and underlirtings are readily detected and are of some interest. Among philosophical works we note that many of John Stuart Mill's books, labelled "From the author" contain frequent marginalia and question marks as well as citations to specific pages on the fly leaf. The Subjection o[ Women (1869), is full of markings, including one adjacent to Mill's comment on the effectiveness of NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 373 women as rulers (p. 100). There are over two score jottings in the copy of C. W. Russell's 1850 translation of Leibniz's System of Theology, and there are many notations in both volumes of Burton's Life and Correspondence of Hume. Taking only underlinings and notations as a guide, we get the suggestion that the eminent Prime Minister did not read much of Kant or Hegel but was quite interested in Hume's moral and political essays and read some of Locke. He gave up reading Lotze after placing a series of question marks in the opening pages of the Hamilton & Jones translation of the Microcosmus. From other sources we know of Gladstone 's interest in Plato, Aristotle, and Bishop Butler. We may not draw any serious conclusions either from the presence or absence of notations in library volumes, of course, but in the case of Berkeley's works it is instructive to observe Gladstone's penned indications in the volumes autographed and sent to him by Professor Fraser. There is not a single mark or entry in either of the first two volumes which contain Berkeley's major philosophical writings. It is apparent, however, that...