The Psychology of Maine de Biran (review)

518 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY as a guarantee of future rewards. "In moral faith, I do not flee this world to a better one; rather, I choose this world. I refuse to despair of it" (169), and in it "we trust the wise purposiveness of the creator and ruler of the world" (171). Faith in immortality means to feel assured that my personality has moral significance in spite of death. Hence I cannot be satisfied merely with what is temporal by some "Heideggerian anticipatory resoluteness" (179). But could such moral faith not be motivated by mere wish fulfillment? And what would its relation be to ecclesiastical institutions? These two questions are treated by the author in a most illuminating way (182-200). The book concludes with a clarifying account of the problems of radical evil and divine grace (Chapter 6). The former, for Kant, is a propensity to evil due to choice, not some innate characteristic of the species, and the latter does not imply "immoral leniency" or irresponsibility but is a postulate required by "a moral attitude toward our past evils and our moral aspirations" (248). Though Professor Wood's straightforward exposition concentrates quite properly on the rich Kantian primary sources, one wonders if his own interpretation might not have been enriched and even supported had he considered those philosophers of religion basically favorable to Kant such as R. H. Lotze, T. H. Green, W. R. Sorley and the American philosophical theologian A. C. Knudson. He does of course deal creatively with such scholarly critics as Erich Adickes, Hermann Cohen, C. C. J. Webb and, oddly, Noah Porter, of a past generation, as well as T. M. Greene, L. W. Beck and John Silber of the present. The book has the effect of a tonic for those who have long thought that Kant's ethical and religious views have more to offer than is generally allowed. Others should and will learn much from this competent study and no future treatment of the problems it considers can possibly ignore it. WARREN E. STEINKRAUS State University College at Oswego The Psychology of Maine de Biran. By F. C. T. Moore. (London: Oxford University Press, 1970. N.p.) F. C. T. Moore has done a careful and sympathetic job of organizing the insights of Maine de Biran (1766-1824) on philosophical psychology and calling them to the attention of an English speaking audience which is largely unfamiliar with his work. Biran was not a systematic thinker. His writings contain many provocative suggestions, but he often failed to develop them fully. He wrote extensively but published relatively little in his own lifetime. Moreover, Moore points out that the manuscripts which he left behind are difficult to work with, not only because of Biran's own revisions but also because his early editors were sometimes careless. No doubt Moore's book is more readable and better organized than Biran's own work, but Moore is careful not to gloss over the problems and gaps in Biran's efforts. At the same time, the reader is introduced to Biran in a way that is clear and intended to bring out the best that he has to offer. What are some of the main points that Moore makes about Biran? At the outset, Moore asserts that Biran's thought and influence are wide ranging. It is, however, in the area of philosophical psychology that Moore takes Biran to make his greatest contributions and to relate most directly to contemporary philosophy. Narrowing his subject matter in this way, Moore concentrates first on Biran's philosophical and psychological method. BOOK REVIEWS 519 Biran rejects three methodological perspectives: (1) a mathematical approach, which tends to ignore empirical data in favor of analyses of human experience based too exclusively on the desire to obtain precise definitions and to use deductive processes of reasoning, (2) an inductive approach, which (a) largely ignores the need for obtaining a sound conceptual framework which can help us to understand why experience is as it is and (b) favors too much an interest in mere observation and classification, and (3) a metaphysical approach (often related to the mathematical perspective) which seeks explanation but does so by...