Qualities and Powers in the Corpuscular Philosophy of Robert Boyle

Qualities and Powers in the Corpuscular Philosophy of Robert Boyle FREDERICK J. O'TOOLE IT IS COMMONPLACEIN CONTEMPORARYSTUDIESon John Locke to find some mention of the considerable influence Robert Boyle had on Locke's thinking on several of the important topics discussed in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding.1 In particular, it is a prevalent feature of recent Locke-Boyle scholarship to attribute to Boyle the theory of qualities developed by Locke in the Essay, and especially the distinction which he draws between primary and secondary qualities. Reginald Jackson in his influential essay, "Locke's Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities,''2 is an advocate of this interpretation of Locke and Boyle, as are R. Harr6 in his Matter and Method3 and Maurice Mandelbaum in his Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception,4 to mention only a few. But although there is general agreement among these authors that the distinction which Locke draws between primary and secondary qualities is modelled on the distinction drawn by Boyle, there is tittle or no agreement among them regarding the nature of the distinction itself. Thus, for example, Reginald Jackson maintains that the distinction as it is drawn by both Boyle and Locke is designed to distinguish between qualities of corporeal objects and "entities" which are wrongly thought to be qualities of corporeal objects---namely, powers---whereas Maurice Mandelbaum maintains that the distinction as it is drawn by both Boyle and Locke is designed to distinguish between qualities of corporeal objects and perceptions or "ideas" of qualities. To avoid misunderstanding , it must be pointed out that the intent of this study is not to attempt to decide between, or to reconcile, these interpretations of Locke and Boyle. Rather my reasons for drawing attention to this disagreement in interpretation is to underline the need for a more careful and complete analysis of both Locke's and Boyle's theory of qualities. 1 See, for example, J. Gibson, Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations (Cambridge, 1917),pp. 260--261; R. I. Aaron, John Locke, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1955),p. 12; F. A. Anderson, The Influence of Contemporary Science on Locke's Method and Results, University of Toronto Studies in Philosophy, II, No. 1 (Toronto, 1923); G. A. J. Rogers, "Boyle, Locke and Reason," Journal of the History of Ideas, 27 (April, 1966), 205-216; J. W. Yolton, Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 19-21, 35 (especially footnote 2); Reginald Jackson, "Locke's Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities," in C. B. Martin and D. M. Armstrong, Locke and Berkeley, A Collection oJ Critical Essays (New York, 1968), pp. 53-77, (originally printed in Mind, XXXVIII [1929]); R. Harr6, Matter and Method (London, 1964), pp. 80-81; Maurice Mandelbaum, Philosophy, Science and Sense Perception (Baltimore, 1964), pp. 19-21, 101, 115. Op. tit., pp. 55-58. a pp. 80-81. 4 pp. 19-21, 101, 115. [2951 296 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Now, since such an undertaking is too large for a work of this kind, and since Locke's theory of qualities has already received a great deal of attention, 5 1 propose, in this study, to examine Boyle's views on the nature of qualities and powers as they are expressed in his numerous writings on natural philosophy. Clearly, if the above mentioned authors are correct in maintaining that Locke inherited his views on qualifies, and in particular the primary-secondary quality distinction, from Boyle, such an examination will be instrumental both for our understanding of Locke's views on these matters and for our understanding of Boyle. Trip STRUCTURE OF MATTER Boyle's earliest and perhaps most striking statement of the theory which was to become known as his "corpuscular hypothesis" is contained in his essay entitled Some Considerations touching the Usefulness o] Experimental Natural Philosophy. ~ In his digression "concerning those that would exclude the Deity from intermeddling with Matter," Boyle maintains, in opposition to those ancient and modern atomists who would deny that God has anything to do with either the production or the government of the physical universe, that to explicate most of the phenomena of nature, we may without absurdity, conceive, that God... having resolved...