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Reviewed by:
  • History of Jewish Philosophy by Daniel H. Frank, Oliver Leaman
  • John Inglis
Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman, editors. History of Jewish Philosophy. Routledge History of World Philosophies, Vol. 2. London: Routledge, 1997. Pp. xii + 934. Cloth, $150.00.

Martin Bernal’s thesis in Black Athena (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987) applies as well to the history of Jewish philosophy, which has been [End Page 316] neglected in the standard general histories of philosophy published since the nineteenth century. Yet, as interest grew in Latin medieval thought, attention was given to Jewish philosophy in order to sketch the Christian intellectual context. That is why the presentation of Jewish philosophy for its own sake as an important continuation and adaptation of the Classical philosophical tradition in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), edited by A. H. Armstrong, marked such a precedent, and its omission in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), edited by Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, such a lacuna. Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman help to supply much of this missing history in the volume under review.

The collection of thirty-nine articles written by thirty-five for the most part prominent younger scholars, offers a fresh detailed account of the arguments of significant philosophers who were Jewish and of the critical roles they played in the history of “Western” philosophy. For this reason the book is especially useful for the study of Jewish philosophy as well as for arriving at a fuller picture of the history of philosophy. For example, David Winston’s discussion of Philo and Alexander Broadie’s article on Maimonides and Aquinas present Jewish philosophical discussions that had widespread implications for both the Jewish and Latin traditions in the medieval, modern, and contemporary periods. Furthermore, the philosophical activity of many of these philosophers in North Africa and the Near East broadens the standard Eurocentric historiography of philosophy.

One reason why philosophers who were Jewish could have such influence outside of Jewish circles is their adoption of universal conceptual schemes, the topic of much of this volume and one which Winston calls the universalization of the Torah (41). T. M. Rudaysky develops this point in reference to medieval Jewish Neoplatonism, Lenn E. Goodman in reference to Judah Halevi, Howard Kreisel to Maimonides, and Seymour Feldman to Gersonides. These uses of the Classical philosophical tradition lead Frank to question whether it makes sense to continue to speak of Jewish philosophy (3–4). His point is that philosophers who were Jewish often treated issues common to the classical tradition and not issues only for Jews. He argues that since it became common to speak of Jewish philosophy only when faced with the problem of assimilation in the nineteenth century, we should not apply this term to all philosophy practiced by Jews, as if there was a single Jewish essence of philosophy.

Respect for historical context is perhaps the single most important contribution made by the editors to the historiography of philosophy. Single chapters are devoted to the historical context of specific centuries and carry philosophical import. For example, within a treatment of the economic basis of philosophy in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries, Marc Saperstein draws a contrast between celibate Christian Friars, whose intellectual and material needs were taken care of within religious communities, and Jewish philosophers, who had to work in order to provide for their own development (296–300). This helps to appreciate the specific issues raised and the difficulties involved in the study of philosophy. Elisheva Carlebach offers another example in a study of the social and cultural context of the seventeenth century, arguing that undue [End Page 317] stress should not be placed on Spinoza’s excommunication (602–605). One among many who held radical views and during a period of unrest brought on by an influx of emigration, Spinoza was dealt the same punishment as those who failed to pay their communal dues. The apt conclusion drawn is that from the perspective of the community, this excommunication was of no great significance. Such history corrects earlier interpretations and helps readers...

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