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570 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY cusses Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation Magnus consults mainly two essays, the one Wer ist Zarathustra?, Who is Zarathustra7 (Magnus has translated this into English ) and Gott ist Tot, God is dead. This being the case we can hardly expect a true picture of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche and especially of his concept of eterna/ recurrence. Magnus quotes for example from God is Dead, where Heidegger states that nihilism for Nietzsche is "the inner logic" of Western history (p. 100). Magnus accuses Heidegger of superimposing his view of nihilism on Nietzsche although in his notes Nietzsche makes such a statement. In addition, Heidegger is not guilty of overlooking Nietzsche's many references to nihilism. It is true that Heidegger sees in the forgetfulness of Being the real nihilism. This, however, does not prevent him from exploring where Nietzsche stands in regard to nihilism. In fact Nietzsche distinguishes two types of nihilism, one passive and the other active, and Heidegger deals with both (Nietzsche II, pp. 49-55, 272-282). Nobody can write properly about Heidegger 's interpretation of eternal recurrence without a thorough acquaintance with his Nietzsche. In these volumes he reformulates and expands on what he had said before about Zarathustra, eternal recurrence, Nietzsche's reasons for proclaiming God is dead etc. Without going into any detail of Magnus' discussion of Heidegger's position on Nietzsche, I would like to give just two further examples of his unfamiliarity with Heidegger's Nietzsche. He says: "Although Heidegger is to some extent justified in failing to stress the cosmological interpretation of eternal recurrence, it does not follow from this that he is justified in ignoring it altogether, which, of course, he does" (p. 134). The fact is that in vol. I, pp. 365-402 Heidegger, of course, deals with the proof for the eternal recurrence and its consequences. Did Heidegger ignore as Magnus claims (p. 138) "the dialectical relation between the religions and the metaphysical"? Of course not. See Nietzsche I pp. 318-329; 487 f and so on. Magnus never comes to grips with Heidegger's real achievement in relation to eternal recurrence. Already Prof. Kaufmarm in his stimulating Nietzsche has stated that the eternal recurrence and the will to power are related concepts. Heidegger went a step further: He has shown that the two terms are inseparable. ELISABETH F. HmSCH Trenton State College Ideas o/ Substance. By Albert L. Hammond. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. Pp. x.iv q- 146) This is a difficult little book, subtle and suggestive. As part of The Johns Hopkins University series, Seminars in the History of Ideas, it addresses itself to substance. It is in a sense a highly personal document. It reveals the effort of a mind to enter into intellectual history in its moments of criticism and insight in a manner that is also critical and searching. Apparently for Professor Hammond the history of ideas is, to use one of his favorite expressions, integral. The philosopher in studying the history of his subject is already carrying it about within him. There is no purely objective history of ideas, unless one wants to say that the objectivity is in the making. "We want to know about the history of the word 'substance'," says Hammond, "and about the answers that have been given and the answer we should give to the question traditionally associated with 'substance': what is really there?" (p. 5). This expresses a concern for meanings and for a vital problem. He compares scientific, philosophical, and common sense usages. This is significant, since philosophy in his estimation is not always the bearer of the full meaning of its problems. He feels that something has gone radically wrong in the facing up to the basic question, what is really there7 This would not be a reasonable attitude if he thought that the history of ideas were the history of BOOK REVIEWS 571 utterances or even the history of intellectual interests. It is for Hammond the history of problems, and the problems endure. The philosopher does not have to assume the idea of intellectualprogress. The principle underlying Hammond's judgment that something has gone wrong in the conception...


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