McTaggart and Findlay on Hegel: The Problem of Contingency

McTaggart and Findlay on Hegel: The Problem of Contingency* NED S. GARVIN I. THE PROBLEM OF CONTINGENCY The concept of an Absolute is one of the most perplexing in philosophy. Regardless of its particular expression, the concept of an ultimate goal or referent of thought reflects a persistent theme in the history of philosophy: indeed, the history of philosophy glitters with Absolutes from the "cosmos" of the Ionians to the Absolutes of Hegel and Bradley. The Absolute, in its perfection, completeness, and explanatory finality, eminently qualifies it as the object of thought. It is none other than the Supreme Answer. Perhaps the greatest strength of the Absolute is its freedom from all the little contingencies of ordinary experience: however, in that strength lies its weakness. The vagaries of experience are a nagging reminder that speculative reason may never neglect the immediacy of experience; and experience is the abode of contingency as surely as speculative reason is the abode of the Absolute. The problem is articulated early in the Parmenides: Are you also puzzled Socrates, about cases that might be thought absurd, such as hair or mud or dirt or any other trivial and undignified objects? Not at all.... That, replied Parmenides, is because you are still young, Socrates, and philosophy has not yet taken hold of you so firmly as I believe it will someday. You will not despise any of these objects then.... (130d) Parmenides brought into relief the peculiarity of reconciling the complete, perfect, "noble" form with such mundane and apparently fortuitous elements as hair, mud, and dirt. Much later in history, Voltaire's Candide bitingly pressed the theological version of the problem: How are we to reconcile seemingly senseless human suffering with an omnipotent, good God? The problem of the status of contingency proved to be as embarrassing here as it did to the Platonic theory of forms. It seems that the existence of contingency has always caused a chafe in the logic of Absolutes. If there is a possibility of solving this odd problem it ought to reside in the philosophy of Hegel, for his works form the summit in the logic of Absolutes. One of the most interesting questions that can be asked of Hegel is just what functional status contingency has in Iris system. Is it an embarrassment to be eliminated, or is it a smoothly functioning element of the system itself? Interestingly enough, Hegelian thought on this point is sufficiently involuted to create conflicting answers in two of his great interpreters. J. M. E. McTaggart believes con- * I wish to express my gratitude for their constructive criticism to Dr. Bernard Elevitch, who read an earlier draft of this paper, and to Mr. Michael Allen, with whom I have discussed many points made herein. [449] 450 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tingency to be a devilment, so much so that it is unavoidable evidence for plurality and leads to the rejection of the Absolute as completely explanatory. J. N. Findlay, however , believes that contingency is not only compatible with the Absolute, but is necessary ! Such polarity over this issue, particularly in so great (and so puzzling) a philosopher , deserves an examination. McTaggart, who conceives of contingency in the very broad sense of "imperfection" reminiscent of Scholastic terminology, states the problem quite neatly: "Either the imperfection in experience leaves a stain on the perfection of the Absolute, or it does not."1 McTaggart, initially, sees a fatal dilemma developing in Hegel: if we admit that contingency is real, that is, if there are fortuitous events, then the Absolute is not perfectly explanatory and is no Absolute at all. If, however, we regard contingency as illusory due to our limited human perspective, then we must give up experience as a source of knowledge. At the very least, then, (a) the Absolute is compromised, or (b) we cannot trust sense experience. Neither alternative seems acceptable. Findlay, on the contrary, believes that contingency is necessary in any logic of Absolutes: "Contingency is in fact the necessary foil and the raw material for the necessary , and even an Absolute must involve contingencies, not merely extrinsically but in mind for itself.''2 In order to understand both positions, and to understand how...