Hobbes on the Basis of Political Obligation

Hobbes on the Basis of Political Obligation GEORGE SCHEDLER THIS ESSAY* IS DEVOTED to showing that Hobbes was not an ethical egoist and to explaining the consequences of this discovery for other interpretations and criticisms of his account of political obligation. 11have divided the body of the essay into four parts: (1) I show that Hobbes held that we are morally obligated to perform those acts which conduce to self-preservation. (2) I show (a) that he distinguished between what is necessary for self-preservation alone and what furthers self-interest generally and (b) that he believed the transition to civil society could be based on the former but not on the latter. (3) I discuss the consequences of this interpretation for criticisms of his account of the grounds of political obligation. (4) I comment on the consequences this reinterpretation has on the plausibility of Hobbes's view of the extent of our political obligations. A few preliminary remarks are in order about the use of such terms as "rational prudence" and "ethical egoism." Those interpreters and critics of Hobbes who feel that these labels are appropriate regard Hobbes as holding that we are obligated--at least in the state of nature-- to do whatever is in our own self-interest. More importantly , they are agreed that if Hobbes holds that we are obligated to do less than this, i.e., that our moral obligations do not extend to all these acts, then Hobbes is not an ethical egoist. To what extent this egoism is enlightened, to what extent it involves general rules, to what extent prudence dictates conduct which rule-egoism does not, and vice-versa, are not my concern here, for what Hobbes says in this respect is sufficiently clear to show that neither a self-interest morality nor a rational prudence morality applies--regardless of the qualifications one might add to these views. (1) That Hobbes holds that we are morally obligated to do whatever conduces to self-preservation is clear from the very definition of "law of nature." To be sure, he * I am indebted to an anonymous referee of this journal for helpful comments which have greatly improved sections3 and 4 of thispaper. It is important to note that, although I am denying,as did Warrender and Taylor, that Hobbes isan egoist, my reasons are hardly the same as theirs. Moreover, I am claiming, contrary to the TaylorWarrender thesis, that Hobbes was a teleologist. See A. E. Taylor, Thomas Hobbes (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1908)and HowardWarrender, The PoliticalPhilosophy of Thomas Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation (London:OxfordUniversityPress, 1957). Secondly, I am neither denyingnor assertingthat Hobbes wasa psychological egoist,thoughit would seem that he wasand that hispsychologicalegoismis relevantto his ethics.Thisviewhas been arguedby Stuart M. Brown, Jr. in "Hobbes: The Taylor Thesis," Philosophical Review 68 (1959), 308-323.The contrary isarguedbyBernardGert in"Hobbesand PsychologicalEgoism,"Journal of the History ofIdeas 28 (1967). [165] 166 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY says they are not properly called "laws" unless they are viewed as God's commands. 2 Nevertheless, he does say that what these laws allow is called "right," what they forbid "wrong. ''3 Thus, if Hobbes holds that we have moral obligations at all, he holds that the laws of nature obligate us.4 This will become clearer as we examine his characterization of a law of nature in Leviathan and De circ. Hobbes says in the Leviathan that a law of nature is a general precept or rule which (a) forbids any individual from doing what would take away his life or "taketh away the means of preserving the same," and (b) requires everyone never to "omit that, by which he thinketh it may best be preserved. ''5 The difference between these two categories is much the same as the difference between intentional wrongdoing and negligence: laws of nature do not merely forbid the performance of acts which result in destruction or vulnerability to destruction, they also forbid any failure to perform acts which one deems conducive to self-preservation. Thus, the specific laws of nature which Hobbes lists after presenting this definition are nothing more than concrete ways in which people may best preserve themselves in this twofold...