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Courage and Wisdom in Plato's Laches DANIEL T. DEVEREUX PLATO DEVOTESa surprising amount of attention to the virtue of courage in the early dialogues. A major portion of the Protagoras is given over to a discussion of the relationship between courage and knowledge (349d-60e). And of course courage is the theme of the Laches. Temperance and piety are the main topics of the Charmides and Euthyphro respectively, but they receive little more than passing attention in other early dialogues. The virtue of justice is not discussed in any of the early dialogues, unless one includes among them Book I of the Republic. Why does Plato single out courage for such special treatment? One possible reason is that courage, more than any of the other moral virtues, seems to be the crucial test case for the Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. The more common view is that morally good conduct requires two things which are distinct: the recognition of what one ought to do, and the resoluteness or strength of will to act in accordance with one's resolves. It is claimed that one often fails, through weakness of will, to do what one knows to be morally right. Resoluteness and strength of will are qualities associated especially with the virtue of courage. If courage is thought of as a virtue displayed not only in conflicts on the field of battle, but also in all inner conflicts between reason and the passions, 1 then the common view can be paraphrased as follows: morally good conduct requires the knowledge of what one ought to do as well as the courage to do it, and these two things are quite distinct. Weakness of will is simply lack of courage, understood in this broad sense. Because of its close connection with the problem of weakness of will, courage is the virtue to focus on if one wants to test the Socratic thesis that virtue is equivalent to knowledge. I believe that in the early dialogues Plato is not merely elaborating the Socratic theory of virtue but is probing and testing it. I think this is the reason why he devotes a seemingly disproportionate amount of attention to the virtue of courage. Indeed, I shall argue that one of the main points Plato wishes to make in the Laches is that courage cannot be defined simply in terms of knowledge. Therefore, if my interpretation of the Laches is sound, we must conclude that Plato is not merely testing the Socratic theory of virtue; he is rejecting one of its fundamental tenets in one of the early dialogues. 2 Before turning to the Laches, I wish to examine a short passage in the Meno dealing with the nature of virtue in general. This passage will, I believe, provide useful guidance for the investigation of the Laches. Socrates argues for such a broad conception of courage in the Laches at 191d-e; el. Gorgias 507b. 21 shall take for granted the correctness of the common view that the Laches is an early dialogue. [129] 130 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY I. VIRTUE AND WISDOM IN THE MENO In the latter half of the Meno Socrates sets out a brief argument which purports to show that virtue is a kind of knowledge or wisdom (87d-89a). The argument may be outlined as follows. (1) Virtue is a good thing, in the sense of being beneficial (87d-e). (2) If there are no good things "separate from'" (xc0p~b/~vov) wisdom, then virtue must be equivalent either to wisdom as a whole, or to some part of wisdom (87d, 8%) .3 (a) All those things generally considered to be good or beneficial, like health and riches, are beneficial only when accompanied by wisdom; when accompanied by folly they are harmful. This is true of all goods apart from wisdom (87e-89a). (b) Hence, all of the so-called goods apart from wisdom are not in themselves good or beneficial (88c-d; cf. Euthydemus 281d-e). (c) Thus, there are no goods separate from wisdom. (3) Therefore, virtue must be equivalent either to wisdom as a whole or to some part of wisdom. There are several problems with the...

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