Freiheit und Kausalität bei Schelling, and: Absolute und endliche Freiheit: Schellings Lehre von Schöpfung und Fall (review)

128 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY technique of the interpretation takes its point of departure from the central concepts of every paragraph in order to elucidate progressively the logical structure of the text. I would be inclined to say that the interpretation of the categories of Dasein is distinguished by a remarkable precision (Encyc. w 90-94, Commentaire, pp. 62-75). Hegel concentrates the logical development of more than fifty pages of the Greater Logic to one page here. L6onard succeeds in tracing out nearly all significant nuances of the text. The situation becomes more complex in the commentary on the doctrine of Wesen and Begriff. The problem is not only that the logical development of the Encyclopedia differs in several points from that of the Greater Logic but, moreover, that the main concepts of the Encyclopedia imply a vast range of significations that are not explicitly formulated. They appear instead in the linguistic and syntactical nuances of the text itself. L6onard, who seems to realize this problem, thus has to refer back to the development of the Greater Logic, which provides the logical means for a more detailed interpretation. I abstain from commenting on these points since they would require a more differentiated discussion. In any case it will be the task of any further research in Hegel's Logic to discuss various passages of this book. L6onard's commentary certainly succeeds in elucidating large parts of Hegel's Logic. Nonetheless, in a more general sense, it seems that the classical type of commentary begins to show its limits when it is applied to a Hegelian text. It will remain a question of future hermeneutical reflection to discuss this problem. L6onard's remarkable merit is to have attempted to fulfill the maxim of a "literal" interpretation from the first to the last page--"se battre avec la lettre m~me du texte h6g61ien." KLAUS HEDWIG Cologne Freiheit und Kausaliti~t bei Schelling. By Joseph A. Bracken. Symposion, Philosophische Schriftenreihe, no. 38. (Freiburg and Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 1972. Pp. 128. DM 24) Absolute und endliche Freiheit: Schellings Lehre von SchOpfung und Fall. By Guido Vergauwen. Studia Friburgensia, Neue Folge, no. 51. (Freiburg, Switzerland: Universit ~tsverlag Freiburg, 1975. Pp. 527. Swiss Fr. 45) Both of these books concentrate on the same cluster of topics in Schelling's philosophy and range over all the major periods of his lengthy career. The opportunity to make a close comparison of the diverse ways in which the two authors define the issues makes easier the task of assessing the achievements and deficiencies of each. Their shared focus falls on two interrelated topics: the relation of God to the world, and the free will of both God and creatures. In unpacking these topics we encounter questions such as these. What is the relation of God's free will to his ontological constitution? Is the existence of creation necessary for the completion of God's own being, or is it the genuinely contingent product of his will? Is free selfdetermination of human creatures compatible with divine causality, specifically with the fact that the basic ontological constituents of the world must reproduce those of God himself?. Schelling's lifelong grappling with the venerable one-many problem, situated in a theistic and voluntaristic context, furnishes the vital linkage of "freedom and necessity" with "creation and fall." These are the central issues in his philosophy of religion that give him the most difficulty. Bracken's compact study answers Zeltner and others who contend that Schelling has no uniform view of freedom spanning the various stages of his authorship. Bracken's own "hypothesis ," convincingly defended, is that the Freiheitsschrift of 1809 displays a conceptual model for freedom of will, both divine and human, that is never subsequently abandoned. After a brief overview of the groundwork laid by the early Schelling, Bracken dwells on the period from 1809 through Die Weltalter (1811-1815) to develop the conceptual model with its BOOK REVIEWS 129 ramifications and applications. Finally, he argues that Schelling consistently maintains the same model throughout the voluminous peregrinations of the philosophy of mythology and revelation. Bracken's conceptual model has three parts. The material component, one also integral to the philosophies...