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228 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY author's own conception of what is and is not "scientific" in Henry's thought. To cite but one example, his discussion of Henry's account of cognition is purposely limited to the processes involved in sensation, leaving the problem of intellective cognition aside as pertaining to altogether distinct philosophical or theological (and hence presumably nonscientific) approaches to psychology. Given this initial formulation of the question, it is fairly easy to conclude that Henry's science reduces psychology to a simple mechanical process; but one wonders whether such a conceptual cleansing leaves us with a truly accurate picture of medieval science in all its complexity. Apart from a stress on Henry's employment of the language of intention and remission and a brief analysis of his discussion of impetus, no real attempt is made to view his specific doctrines in comparison with the work of such better-known contemporaries as Buridan and Oresme. Such a task would represent a major undertaking, although it is to be hoped that Steneck will pursue his research further in this direction. In the absence of such a comparative study, not only must an overall evaluation of the originality of Henry's scientific attainments be postponed, but nagging questions will remain regarding the degree to which he can be viewed as truly representative of late medieval science in general. To what extent, for example, do Henry's clearly theological interests vitiate general conclusions about medieval science drawn from his Lecturae? To contrast his attitude toward the study of nature (as outlined by Steneck in his conclusion) with that of a more "secular" scientist working solely within the confines of an arts faculty might well disclose quite differing approaches. That medieval theologians did develop and employ scientific views in the way Henry does is surely important, but it may well represent merely one strand of the fabric of medieval science. Clearly, Henry's attitude cannot be ignored by anyone seeking an overall perspective on the scientific achievements of the later Middle Ages, but generalization must be approached with exceeding caution. In sum, Steneck's study is to be commended as providing a stimulating survey of a broad range of medieval scientific doctrines that succeeds in conveying a sympathy for its subject's aims and methods. Its breadth makes it particularly useful as a general introduction for students and nonspecialists; and historians of medieval thought will welcome the new information it brings to light on the scientific interests of Henry of Langenstein. FREDERICKPURNELL, JR. Queens College, CUNY Giambattista Gelli and the Florentine Academy: The Rebellion against Latin. By Armand L. De Gaetano. Biblioteca dell' "Archivum Romanum," series 1, vol. 119. (Florence: Leo Olschki editore, 1976. Pp. viii + 432) The subject of this most pleasant and learned monograph is the life and works of a Florentine shoemaker, Giambattista Gelli, called I1 Gello (1498-1563). Like his celebrated contemporary , Hans Sachs of N0rnberg, Gelli made books as well as shoes. His fame rests on his contributions to Italian prose literature: he translated many works from Latin, wrote commentaries on Dante and original works on moral and humanist subjects. Italian literature, like most others, begins with poetry; and Gelli was among the first to treat serious subjects in prose. He wrote, of course, in his native Florentine, which he naively insists is the most appropriate language for all mankind because it is the easiest (p. 113). The author, recently deceased, examines the life and works of Gelli, his role in advancing the use of the vernacular, the literary character of his translations, and his philosophic and religious opinions. The most interesting part of this book for a philosopher deals with Gelli's writings on the dignity of man, a characteristic humanist topic. Gelli was influenced by the philosophies of Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola on this point, but his view is more pessimistic. He ascribes to man no happiness in this life: the value of life lies in the possibility BOOK REVIEWS 229 of attaining immortality (pp. 177, 182). The Platonic inspiration here is obvious. On most other philosophic points, however, Gelli follows Aristotle, particularly in the "Averroist" interpretation of Pomponazzi. De Gaetano seems to...

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