Perception and Immateriality in The Nouveaux Essais

Perception and Immateriality in The Nouveaux Essais NICHOLAS JOLLEY "JE M'ATTACHE SUR TOUT A vindiquer l'immaterialit6 de l'ame." It was in these terms that Leibniz stated his purpose in writing the Nouveaux Essais in a letter to Jaquelot on 28 April 1704,1 by which time a complete draft of the work was nearly finished. As a description of the Nouveaux Essais this remark may seem curious, and it could not possibly explain the form in which Leibniz chose to write against Locke. At first sight the Nouveaux Essais looks very unlike a sustained and unified address to the task of vindicating the soul's immateriality. In the main body of the work only a page is devoted to refuting Locke's argument that the soul's immateriality cannot be demonstrated a priori, and an analysis of the first draft reveals that originally Leibniz did not even intend to devote a separate section of the dialogue to this question. 2 The Nouveaux Essais gives the impression of being an unusually loose critique, which deals with a wide selection of unconnected issues: as Gibson observes, Leibniz seems to be simply setting down his own views under the stimulus afforded by the thought of another. 3 Indeed the work answers Leibniz's account of the unsystematic way in which he wrote it, for he himself admits that it was completely unplanned. 4 However, although Leibniz's statement of his purpose in the work cannot explain the form of his refutation of Locke, it can at least be made intelligible as a description of it. In this paper I wish to analyze some of the main ways in which Leibniz's concern with what he regarded as a major issue in natural theology can be seen to dominate this work. Since the Nouveaux Essais looks so little like an explicit attempt to vindicate the soul's immateriality, its approach must be indirect: the treatment of issues apparently unconnected with this doctrine must in fact be an indirect fulfillment of his dominant purpose. Now if the form of the Nouveaux Essais is determined by the nature of Locke's own thought, then obviously for Leibniz there is a persistent attempt throughout Locke's Essay to undermine the soul's immateria!ity. 5 In other words, i Die Philosophischen Schriften yon G. W. Leibniz, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1875-1890), 3:473; hereafter cited as Gerhardt. 2 LH 4, vol. 5, la, bl. 113, Niedersachsische Landesbibliothek, Hanover. J. Gibson, Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations (Cambridge, 1917), p. 267. "Leibniz to D'Ausson, 9 February 1704, LBr 20, bl. 3v, Niedersachsische Landesbibliothek, Hanover. This is an undated draft of the copy that was sent, which is now in the Leyden UB, MS 293 B fol. 230 seq. Cf. Leibniz to Jaquelot, 28 April 1704, Gerhardt 3:474. 5Whether Leibniz thought that Locke consciously aimed to destroy natural theology is obscure. In the letter to Jaquelot he says that he is convinced that Locke's intentions are sound, but on other occasions Leibniz is more equivocal. See, for instance, Leibniz to Bierling, Gerhardt 7 :488. The date, 19 November 1709, is deleted. [181] 182 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Leibniz's statement of his purpose reveals implicitly the kind of work he took the Essay to be. One example of the strategy Leibniz discovers in the Essay is furnished by his claim that Locke seized on Newton's theory of attraction as soon as it appeared because it lent support to his doubts about the soul's immateriality. 6 The theory provided confirmation for the thesis that matter might be endowed with faculties that were not derivable from its essence: for Leibniz, thought and attraction are parallel cases of powers that would be miraculous in matter. Thus, though the Newtonian theory of the nature of the interaction between bodies seems a wholly independent issue, it really tends to buttress Locke's materialist speculation. The connection Leibniz discovers between the arguments of the Essay is clearly stated in a passage that prefaced the original draft of the Nouveaux Essais. Here Leibniz describes the importance of the argument for innate ideas...