A Reply to Professor Stevens

338 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (4) x contains formally the quality Q if and only if x actually has the quality Q. (5) x contains eminently the quality Q if and only if there is something R such that R is different from, and more excellent than, Q, and x has R. Thus, for example, Descartes would contain formally the quality of extension just in case Descartes was actually extended, and he would contain extension eminently just in case there was something more excellent than extension, and Descartes had it. Propositions (2)-(5) are meant as necessary truths, expressing what Descartes means by containing something formally and containing something eminently. Since (5) is a necessary truth, we can see that 15 is true, that it is logically impossible for something to contain absolute perfection eminently. For suppose that something x contains the quality of absolute perfection eminently. Then, by (5), there is something R such that R is different from and more excellent than absolute perfection, and x has R. But obviously nothing that x has could be more excellent than absolute perfection. Thus it is impossible for anything to contain the property of absolute perfection eminently. Hence 15 is true. Norton has objected that Brewster does not show that the putative hidden faculty does not or could not contain eminently the perfection contained objectively in the idea of God. Now that we see what Descartes means by containing a perfection eminently, we can see that it is easy to show that Descartes's hidden faculty does not and could not contain the perfection contained objectively in the idea of God, that is, absolute perfection, eminently. Furthermore, we can see that since it is impossible for anything to contain absolute perfection eminently, Brewster's argument can be reformulated (as I do above) to show, given Descartes's causal principle and his conception of God, that if Descartes may have an unknown faculty, then Descartes cannot be the source of his idea of God. JOHN C. STEVENS Texas A & M University A REPLY TO PROFESSOR STEVENS Professor Stevens attempts to show that, if Descartes may have a faculty not known to himself, then he cannot be (on his principles) the cause of his idea of God. To reach this conclusion, Stevens has focused on two notions, absolute perfection and eminent containment, and premises including these terms (his 11, 12, and 15) are central to his conclusion. However, Stevens's analysis of the logic of eminent containment is significantly incomplete, nor has he satisfactorily explicated Descartes's remarks about absolute perfection. In his discussion of eminent containment, Stevens cites Descartes's discussion of what is needed to produce a stone ("par exemple, la pierre qui...), and comes to the conclusion that Descartes holds principles (1)-(5), and most importantly, (3) x contains eminently what is in y if and only if x contains things other than, and more excellent than, the things contained in y. "Thus, for example," says Stevens, "Descartes would contain formally the quality of NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 339 extension just in case Descartes was actually extended, and Descartes would contain extension eminently just in case there was something more excellent than extension, and Descartes had it" (p. 338, emphasis added). However, before formalizing the notion of eminent containment, Stevens should have taken into account Descartes's continuation of the cited passage, and the further explication given in the second set of Replies: & la chaleur ne peut estre produite dans vn sujet qui en estoit auparauant priu6, si ce n'est par vne chose qui soit d'vn ordre, d'vn degr6 ou d'vn genre au moins aussi parfait que la chaleur, & ainsi des autres. Mais encore, outre cela, l'id6e de la chaleur, ou de la pierre, ne peut pas estre en moy, si elle n'y a est6 mise par quelque cause, qui contienne en soy pour le moins autant de realitY, que i'en convoy dans la chaleur ou dans la pierre.' IV. Les mesmes choses sont dites estreformellement dans les objets des id6es, quand elles sont en eux telles que nous les conceuons; & elles font dites y estre eminemment, quand elles n'y sont pas la verit6 telles, mais qu...