Berkeley's Theory of Space

Berkeley's Theory of Space ROBERT GRAY Introduction' As Karl Popper has argued, Berkeley's views on physics were remarkably modern in character. His rejection of absolute space and hence of absolute motion, a rejection not endorsed by most of the natural philosophers and physicists of his own day, was an anticipation of modern relativistic physics. ~But while Berkeley can be seen as having been in many respects a precursor of the modern scientific view, the appreciation of his philosophy cannot be restricted to noting the degree and the extent to which he anticipates modern thought. What is needed is an internal philosophical analysis of his views on the nature of such concepts as space, time, and motion. It is just such an analysis of his views on the nature of space that I intend to present here. Although it would be in itself interesting and worthwhile, a study of the historical context in which Berkeley developed his views on space is not something I intend to undertake at this time. To understand the historical sources of a theory, it is necessary to begin at least with some conception of the nature of that theory. Still, for all his outstanding ingenuity, Berkeley was very much a mart of his time, and his natural philosophy was a hybrid view, the product of two very different and, in some respects, incompatible views on the nature of space, time, and motion. Since the combination of these views gives Berkeley problems, it will be helpful both to an understanding of why he took the views that he did and to an understanding of his failure to see their more troublesome consequences at least to allude to those historical sources; and here we may be content, I think, with noting the two major sources of influence. In developing his own theory, one of Berkeley's major concerns was to reject "the dangerous dilemma" he saw arising from the Newtonian view of space as absolute-the dilemma that either God and "real space" are identical or that there is something besides God that possesses attributes otherwise reserved on theological grounds to the Divinity (P, 117). Berkeley here speaks of "several" writers who have felt compelled to take one or the other of these two views. It is not possible to say I have used the followingabbreviations to refer to Berkeley'sworks: NTV, Essay Toward a New Theory of vision; PC, Philosophical Commentaries; P, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge; TD, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous; DM, De Motu; A, The Analyst. All referencesto Berkeley'sworksare to The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop ofCloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop,9vols.(London:ThomasNelsonand Sons, 1948).Unlessotherwisenotedall references are to sectionor entry numbersrather than to pages. Referencesto DM are to Luce's translation. 2 Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 166-74. [415] 416 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY whom he is referring to with any assurance; however, the latter alternative had been endorsed explicitly by Henry More, 3and in PC 298 Berkeley refers in this connection to Locke, More, and Raphson (who, he claims in one of his letters to Johnson, purported to have found fifteen characteristics in which God and space agree).' It would at least seem fairly clear from the general tenor of virtually all Berkeley's references to absolute space that his own view of space as relational was adopted chiefly to avoid this theological difficulty and that his primary object of concern, no doubt because of its popularity, was Newton and the Newtonians in general. Other sources of influence are more difficult to pinpoint with certainty; however, recent research has made it almost indubitable that at least one, if not the major, source of influence in this connection is the attack on extension in Bayle's Historical and Critical Dictionary, especially the articles on Pyrrho and Zeno of Elea.5 Harry M. Bracken has argued, I think decisively, that Berkeley's minima sensibilia are introduced and serve precisely to meet the problems posed here by Bayle. 6 Still, this is a historical, not a philosophical, account, and it seems to me...