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BOOK REVIEWS 341 Though Wallace limits his discussion to the above-mentioned philological and historical matters (and in so doing he produces a first-rate work of scholarship), his book has more general significance. The evidence he provides is relevant to the problem of the connection between medieval thought and the rise of modern science; the problem of the process by which Galileo arrived at his later scientific discoveries and theories that made him famous; and the problem of the philosophical roots, content, and character of Galileo's work. Finally, I should note the rather curious fact that the logical structure of the content of these notebooks is very similar to the logical structure of the content of Galileo's mature work, the Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems, as it has emerged from my own studies into the latter. MAURICEA. FINOCCHIARO University of Nevada, Las Vegas Maurice Crosland, ed. The Emergence of Science in Western Europe. New York: Science History Publications, 1976. Pp. 201. $18.00. The chapters that make up this book were originally papers presented at the meeting of the British Society for the History of Science in the summer of 1974. Some of the chapters should be of interest to historians of philosophy for the information they provide concerning relations that existed between (anachronistically) science and philosophy. The chapters cover the period between the late sixteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century and deal with aspects of science, scientists, and institutions in specific countries. The first five pieces concern themselves with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. With the possible exception of Knight's chapter on German Romantics, "Naturphilosophie," these papers are likely to be of most interest to readers of this journal. Crosland begins the volume with a name-dropping introduction that attempts to discuss the question of doing history (of science, in particular) in geographical or nationalistic fashion. The papers following more often do a better job of providing a rationale for their method of approach. A. G. Keller's "Mathematicians, Mechanics and Experimental Machines in Northern ltaly in the Sixteenth Century" treats of the Renaissance artist-engineer tradition. He provides a readable account of some views of the relation betwen theory and practice that were then prevalent. Tanaglia, Guidabaldo dal Monte, and Savorgnan are discussed and interestingly quoted, but there is little analysis of the concepts these men employed. Still, the paper provides a survey of ideas with which historians of sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuryphilosophy ought to be familiar. "Science in the Italian Universities in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries," by C. B. Schmitt, is the start of an interesting and correcting picture of the role of universities during this seminal period. Schmitt deals, for the most part, with institutional and curricular matters, but these have implications for those who still write under the influence of Randall's work on methodology. It is a good survey of universitymovements and contains many suggestive hints that are not developed in this paper. The details concerning the lack of any significant role for theology in the universities, and concerning the debate over certainty in mathematics versus the syllogism are just two topics in Schmitt's paper that philosophers would find important. M. B. Hall's paper, "Science in the Early Royal Society," presents details and quotations from members dealing with method. The paper is marred by an extremely uncritical use of 342 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY rationalism and empiricism that leads to an unhelpful analysis of the methodological controversies in which the Society engaged. The quotations (e.g., from Wallis [p. 65] and Pardies [p. 66]) often show the confusion, complexity and sheer prejudice of these people rather than the simple-minded commitment to empiricism upon which Hall seems to insist. I found the analysis of the Hooke-Newton controversy in terms of rationalism versus empiricism quite unhelpful and failing to do justice to Newton's theological and Cartesian background (pp. 71-72). Nor has Hall progressed any in her understanding of Spinoza beyond the unsympathetic and misguided footnotes appearing in Volumes I and 2 of the edition of the Oldenburg Correspondence . Still, the piece contains information that philosophers dealing with seventeenth-century figures should be...

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