The Logic of Hegel's Logic

The Logic of Hegel's Logic TERRY PINKARD ONE OF THE PROBLEMSinvolved in doing the history of philosophy is reinterpreting past philosophers in such a way that the relevance of their work to contemporary discussion can become clear. In doing so one often finds that certain doctrines to which a philosopher himself attached great significance may not be central to a particular line of his argument. Recent efforts at interpreting Kant have attempted, for example, to disentangle the objectionable part of the Kantian metaphysics from the "objective" argument contained therein. The whole doctrine of transcendental psychology in Kant's first Critique, for example, may perhaps be shelved without injuring the rational core of the argument. With Hegel, however, the case seems prima facie more difficult, since Hegel's whole system is seemingly tied down to a very obscure metaphysics, that of the "World Spirit." However, just as not all of Kant's doctrine is necessary to his philosophy, perhaps not all of Hegel's philosophy is inextricably bound up with commitment to such shadowy entities. In this paper I would like to try to draw out the central argumentative core of Hegel's Scienceoj Logic. To do this, I will first sketch briefly what Hegel takes to be the goal of such a theory. Second, I will outline the basic logical structure of the work. The result will be, it is hoped, a presentation of Hegel's philosophy that will make it not the obscure confidant of World Spirit, but rather one not far from contemporary concerns. i. Hegel's Idea of Philosophical Theory Hegel begins the Wissenschafl der Logik with a rejection of the "Given" in experience. The Phenomonology of Mind is taken to be the argument for this, and thus Hegel says he must presuppose that work in erecting the kind of theory offered in the Logik. If there is not brute given in experience irreducible to conceptual treatment, then philosophical theory can go two ways: either one can construct "hypothetical" philosophies or one can look for transcendental conditions within the conceptual framework itself. Hegel opts for the latter. Such a theory, so he claims, must be reconstructive: "Consequently, logical science in dealing with thought determinations.., will also be a reconstruction of them.'" Such a reconstruction amounts to (1) "translating" (redescribing) other modes of experience into conceptual form and (2) linking the concepts logically with one another. Insofar as philosophy is to be logical reconstruction, it is also an a priori discipline . The validity of the concepts in question is to be obtained not by comparing 1 would like to thank Professors Klaus Hartmann and Don lhde for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would like to thank also Dr. Gitnther Maluschke for his suggestions about particular parts of the architectonic. G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaftder Logik, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1971), 1:19 (hereafter cited as WL).All translations from this book are my own. [417] 418 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY them with things that are their instances (indeed, to see something as an instance of a concept presupposes a prior knowledge of the concept), nor by giving various empirical examples of them. Instead, the validity of such concepts is to be obtained immanently, that is, logically, solely through their relations to one another. Hegel expresses it in a characteristic manner: In that philosophy owes its development to the empirical sciences, it gives their content the essential form offreedom of thought (of the a priori) and the confirmation of necessity instead of the attestation of that which is "lit upon" [Vorfindens] and of the experienced fact; the fact becomes an exhibition and image of the original and completely independent activity of thought. 2 Philosophical theory reconstructs items so as to exhibit their logical ("necessary") relations. Thought legislates for itself according to logical norms and thus achieves a "true" necessity. Transcendental considerations, however, lead Hegel to the conclusion that the logical relations cannot be taken in, as it were, from the outside. To presuppose them is to leave them in philosophical limbo; it is to make them surds. If the reconstruction is to be complete, so Hegel thinks, the logical relations must themselves...