Studies in the Philosophy of Kierkegaard (review)

100 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY E. D. Klemke. Studies in the Philosophy of Kierkegaard. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. Pp. 69. Gld. 25. Having made previous contributions to the study of Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein, Klemke turns his attention in this essay to central issues in the "philosophy" of Kierkegaard in a rather terse series of "studies." By informing us in a footnote that the work of David Swenson and Paul Holmer is "more reliable than most of the literature about Kierkegaard which exists today" (p. 14, n. 27), he spares himself the task of consulting the dozen or so excellent interpretations of Kierkegaard's thought that have appeared since the 1950s. Such a cavalier attitude toward scholarship would be excusable if we were presented with bold, exciting, or reasonably original discussions of significant aspects of the thought of the elusive Dane. Unfortunately, even though he is cognizant of the subtlety of Kierkegaard's philosophical reflections, Klernke's interpretations of only a limited number of issues in the vast corpus of Kierkegaard's writings are either unilluminating , confused, or positively misleading. Taking up the task of correcting some misinterpretations of Kierkegaard in Paton's The Modern Predicament, Klemke correctly points out that Paton is wrong in holding that SK indicated no interest in the beating of science on religion insofar as he specifically intended that his description of the psychospiritual dimensions of human existence would preserve the subjective perspective of individual life in the face of various forms of objectivism. In the course of his defense of SK, Klemke accurately mentions SK's references to tautological "objective truth" and his awareness of the distinction between cognitive and emotive meaning in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (p. 3, n. 10). 1 Rather than simply admit or ignore Paton's bland claim that Kierkegaard "denies any objective [scientific, empirical] basis for religion," Klemke engages in a typical rambling discussion of Kierkegaard that mixes sympathetic understanding and vagary. The obvious emphasis upon the subjective inwardness of faith is referred to and the notion of "truth is subjectivity" is mentioned without explanation. Despite a few references to Concluding Unscientific Postscript, our author misses the opportunity to point out that a religious person is "in truth" in the intensified "how" of the subjectivity of faith or that state of being in which the objective uncertainty of the "object of faith" (the paradoxical God-man) and "the passion of inwardness" are dialectically intermingled. Despite his sincere attempt to grasp Kierkegaard's concept of faith, the author becomes entangled in the snares of Kierkegaard's dialectical analyses. After properly defending SK against the naive charges that he avoids "objective thinking" and is self-centered to an antireligious degree, the author satisfies himself that he has "shed light upon some rather persistent confusions and misinterpretations" of Kierkegaard (p. 13). In subsequent chapters there are attacks on the notion that SK is an "arch-irrationalist" and discussions of his "behavioral" ethics. Struggling with SK's "ethical theory," the author remarks that there is no objective, rationalistic basis for ethics and that "each individual must establish his own rules." Compounding this latter intellectual felony, Klemke goes on to say that because each of us is an "isolated selF' there can be no prescription for others, nor can we know what is morally appropriate for others (p. 36). Not only is this rather arbitrary individualized "ethics" not presented by SK, but it is a complete distortion of an ethics of subjectivity that seeks to express "the essentially human" in accentuated, self-reflective (i.e., Socratic) subjectivity. Simply put, Kierkegaard indirectly communicates his version of Socratic individuation: become a morally self-conscious, ironic, concemful person who strives to realize the "ideal self' (Either~Or)or attain what Kierke- ' Although the distinction between cognitive and emotive meaningcould probably be extracted fromConcludingUnscientificPostscript ,the clearest and mostpervasive distinctionKierkegaardrefers to in this complex work is that between abstract, objective thought and a necessarilyparadoxicalexistentialthought. BOOK REVIEWS 101 gaard In'st characterized as an "authentic existence," Although there is no one work that presents his practical, existential ethics, it is possible to reconstruct such an ethics.2 In a chapter entitled "Kierkegaard and the Meaningfulness of Religious Statements" we are led...